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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
LOAN AND PROGRAM SUMMARY
Borrower: Republic of Korea.
Amount and terms: US$2.0 billion-Single Currency Loan in US Dollars for 15 years including 5
years' grace, at an interest rate of 6-month US Dollar LIBOR (reset semiannually)
plus 75 basis points, and with a service charge of 1.5 percent of the loan amount
payable on effectiveness.
Description: The proposed second structural adjustment loan (SAL II) is part of a series of
World Bank adjustment loans in support of the major structural reform program
that the Government of Korea has launched in response to the economic crisis. It
builds on the work initiated under an Economic Reconstruction Loan approved on
December 23, 1997, and continued under a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I)
approved on March 26, 1998. The proposed SAL II will help Korea restore
financial stability while mitigating the social costs of adjustment, and implement
deep structural reforms in the financial and corporate sectors to pave the way for
Korea's return to strong and sustained growth. The loan is part of an
internationally coordinated support package for Korea.
SAL II calls for macroeconomic policies designed to mitigate the severity of the
recession while consolidating the progress made in strengthening the external
financial position, within the framework of the macroeconomic program agreed
with the IMF. The structural reform program it supports spans three key areas:
financial sector reform, including the resolution of weak financial institutions,
strengthening of prudential regulation and supervision, and capital market
development; corporate sector reform, including corporate debt restructuring,
reform of corporate governance and competition policies, and reform and
privatization of state-owned corporations; and labor market reform and
strengthening of social safety nets. The Government's commitment o the reform
program supported by the loan is set out in the Policy Matrix (Annex 1).
Benefits and risks: Benefits. Besides helping Korea overcome its external financial crisis and restore
investor confidence, the proposed loan will support a program of major structural
reforns aimed at bringing about a fundamental restructuring of the incentives and
institutional framework to underpin financial sector stability, restructure corporate
finances, improve corporate efficiency and competitiveness, and enable Korea to
return to a path of robust growth in the context of today's more integrated and
competitive global economy. The loan will support policies to cushion the impact
of the crisis and economic restructuring on the poor and the vulnerable as well as
make lasting improvements in Korea's system of social protection. The region, and
the international financial system at large, also would benefit from an early
restoration of market confidence and recovery of growth in Korea.
Risks. Despite progress, investor confidence remains fragile and the external
position is still vulnerable to major shocks. There are risks in the external
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environment, especially related to the regional situation, e.g., developments in
Japan. Mitigating these risks is the finnness the Government has demonstrated in
implementing tough macroeconomic policies, which inspires confidence in its
macroeconomic risis response ability. The implementation of the IMF program is
on track. The rebuilding of international reserves since the crisis also provides a
cushion against shocks, as does the restructuring of foreign liabilities toward
longer maturities. The provision of additional adjustment financing by the Bank
through the proposed loan, and the structural reforms conducive to restoration of
Korea's competitiveness and foothold in export markets that the loan would
support, would provide further comfort to markets.
The fragility of the banking system and high corporate leverage are major sources
of vulnerability in the Korean economy. Addressing these vulnerabilities through
financial and corporate sector restructuring forms the core of the SAL II program.
The required restructuring, however, will be a difficult process and risks of
slippage cannot be ignored. The risks arise from several factors: pressures from
vested interests that militate against deep restructuring and could lead instead to a
"muddle-through" approach; inefficient, non-transparent use of public resources
that accentuates moral hazard and results in large fiscal costs without achieving
meaningful, durable restructuring; weak financial system and corporate
governance; and inadequate implementation capacities. The proposed prograrn
mitigates these risks by putting in place a clear, monitorable framework for
financial and corporate sector restructuring, building in appropriate incentives and
safeguards; setting out clear criteria for public resource use; supporting
complementary actions to improve financial system and corporate governance; and
providing technical assistance to both supervisory authorities and units in banks
specially set up to negotiate corporate debt workouts (supported by the Financial
and Corporate Restructuring Assistance Loan approved on August 6, 1998).
Political factors may also hinder reform: shifts in the balance of power between
the ruling and opposition parties; severity of the economic downturn causing
political support for reform to unravel; increasing labor union militancy as
unemployment rises; and a premature sense of complacency as the external
financial situation improves. The strong commitment o reform demonstrated by
the Government so far, reflected in the implementation of major and politically
difficult reforms, provides assurance against these risks. Union militancy has
increased, but union actions so far have failed to attract wider public support and
the Government has committed to stand firm in defense of its pro-reform agenda.
The Government, supported by the Bank program, is taking a number of measures
to strengthen the social safety net, and has followed a participatory approach in
designing policy responses within a tripartite forum bringing together government,
business and labor representatives, measures that contribute to preserving the
social consensus for reform.
Poverty category: N.A.
Disbursements: The loan would be disbursed in two equal tranches, the first upon effectiveness
and the second upon satisfaction of second tranche release conditions.
Project ID Number: KR-PE-56521
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
The proposed loan is a second World Bank structural adjustment loan (SAL II) in support of the
Republic of Korea's program of structural reforms. It builds upon the work initiated under an Economic
Reconstruction Loan (ERL) approved by the Board on December 23, 1997 in an amount of $3 billion, and
continued under a structural adjustment loan (SAL I) approved on March 26, 1998 in an amount of $2
billion.. The program supported by the proposed loan aims to deepen reforms in the priority areas of
financial sector restructuring, corporate sector restructuring, and strengthening of social safety nets. Its
goal is to assist Korea in the restoration of financial stability while mitigating the social impact of the crisis
and support structural reforms that address the root causes of the crisis and lay the basis for Korea's return
to strcng and sustainable growth.
The proposed loan is a two-tranche, fast-disbursing operation. The loan amount is $2 billion,
divided equally into two tranches. The proposed loan is grounded in a medium-term strategic framework
for support to Korea's structural reform program, and is part of the international financing package for
Korea. agreed in December 1997. The Bank undertook to provide up to $10 billion in support of Korea's
structalral reforms as part of that package.
1[. MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, POLICIES AND PROSPECTS
1.1 Recent Developments. Korea has made considerable progress in stabilizing its external financial
position. However, the downturn in the domestic economy has been severe. The central challenge for
macroeconomic policy now is to mitigate the severity of the recession and facilitate an economic recovery
while consolidating the progress in restoring external financial stability.
1.2 In response to the crisis, Korea has implemented a strong macroeconomic program designed to
restore stability in the foreign exchange market, rebuild international reserves, and contain potential
inflationary pressures resulting from the economic shocks. Macroeconomnic policies designed within the
framework of an IMF stand-by program involved a sharp tightening of monetary policy (reflected in a rise
in benchmark interest rates from a pre-crisis level of around 12 percent to 30 percent) as well as some
fiscal tightening. The stance of these macroeconomic policies has been progressively eased during the
course of the year as stability returned to the foreign exchange market but also in response to a domestic
economic downturn that turned out to be much sharper than initially projected. Korea has also been
implementing a structural reform program to address the underlying causes of the crisis and pave the way
for an eventual return to robust growth. Supported by Bank adjustment loans, the structural reform
program focuses on financial and corporate sector restructuring and policies to mitigate the social impact
of the crisis.
1.3 Over the past three months or so, Korea has seen a significant improvement in its external financial
position. The Won exchange rate has recently hovered around W1350 to the US dollar, having recovered
from a low of W1960 reached in December 1997 at the height of the financial crisis. The current account
balance has adjusted dramatically. Much of the improvement in the trade balance has been on account of a
compression of imports, but there has also been an export volume response. A current account surplus of
$3740 billion is now projected for 1998 (representing a swing from a deficit of 1.9 percent of GDP in
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1997 to a surplus of 12-13 percent). As of mid-September, gross usable reserves stood at about $42 billion,
having recovered from a low of $4 billion at the peak of the crisis. The maturity structure of external debt
has been improved, with the short-term external debt reduced to about $40 billion from $68 billion at end-
1997 (and about $100 billion in 1996). Detailed data on macroeconomic developments and projections are
presented in Annex 2, Tables 1-6.
1.4 While developments on the external front have been encouraging, the recession in the domestic
economy has deepened. Projections of output growth have been revised downwards several times over the
past few months, and GDP is now expected to decline by about 7 percent in 1998. Mirroring the
contraction in output, unemployment has risen sharply. The open unemployment rate was estimated at 7.4
percent in August, up from about 3 percent before the crisis, and is expected to rise further with the
deepening of the recession. More layoffs are inevitable as larger corporations and financial institutions
undertake fuller restructuring; so far layoffs have been concentrated in small and medium-size enterprises.
Likewise, the stock market has weakened considerably, losing all of its post-crisis gain. The stock market
index is now well below the low reached in December 1997.
1.5 An economic downturn was inevitable as a result of the crisis and the macroeconomic policy
tightening implemented in response, but the recession has proved to be more severe than originally
projected for several reasons. First, there has been a large drop in domestic demand, led initially by a sharp
decline in investment and intensified more recently by a drop in private consumption. The fall in private
demand was exacerbated by a contractionary fiscal policy. Second, financial and corporate sector distress
is deep and widespread. Given the very high leverage of Korea's corporate sector, corporate financial
positions, and consequently also the health of the portfolios of creditor financial institutions, are
particularly vulnerable to interest rate spikes. The decline in economic activity and corporate and financial
sector distress have reinforced each other (Box 1). Third, the regional contagion effect and the
simultaneous contraction of economic activity in other East Asian countries has dampened the potential for
a significant export-led recovery. Roughly one-half of Korea's exports are within Asia.
1.6 Exports provided a stimulus to aggregate demand in the first quarter of this year, helping to offset
some of the decline in domestic demand. Although in (US dollar) value terms exports grew only by 3
percent year on year in the first quarter of 1998, export volume growth (excluding one-time gold sales) was
around 20 percent. Export growth, however, started to slow in the second quarter, and is likely to slow
further for several reasons. First, as the scope for inventory draw-down declines, constraints in trade
financing would become more binding. Second, declining demand in the rest of Asia, together with the
appreciation of the Won on the one hand and the depreciation of partner country currencies on the other,
could dampen export growth.' A significant further depreciation of the Japanese Yen, in particular, could
have a sizable effect on Korea's exports. Japan is both a significant importer from Korea and a competitor
in third markets.
1.7 Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which account for around 40 percent of Korea's exports
and the bulk of employment, are particularly affected by a credit crunch. The Government has taken
several steps to mitigate the impact-an expanded official export credit guarantee scheme, a central bank
refinancing scheme for Won-denominated loans to exporters, a limited rollover of maturing SME debt to
1 At the peak of the financial crisis, Korea's real effective xchange rate had depreciated by more than 40
percent from pre-crisis levels. Since then it has appreciated by about 25 percent. While the real effective xchange
rate remains 15-18 percent depreciated from pre-crisis levels, the scope for further real appreciation is now more
limited, increasing Korea's sensitivity to further significant changes in major trading partner exchange rates.
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provide a breathing space, and more recently a $3 billion SME import financing scheme and a $300 million
SME export financing scheme. While these actions have helped ease SME financial difficulties, a fuller
resolution of their problems will depend on a broader resumption of bank lending as well as recovery
among larger corporations to which many of the SMEs in Korea have traditionally been financially and
commercially linked.
Box 1: MACROECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND CORPORATE SECrOR NEXUS
Policy challenges facing Korea have been rendered more complex by the fact that macroeconomic
developments and the problems of the corporate and financial sectors have reinforced each other. In particular, the
structure and weaknesses of the balance sheets of Korean corporations have made them very vulnerable to changes
in key macroeconomic variables, especially interest rates. Korean corporations are very highly leveraged, with the
thirty largest conglomerates (chaebol) having an average debt-equity ratio of about 520 percent as of end-1997
(600 percent including their financial affiliates). This compares with an industrial country norm of below 200
percent. Total corporate debt is currently estimated to be on the order of $500 billion (more than 150 percent of
GDP at current exchange rates), of which around 90 percent is domestic debt.
Given the high indebtedness of Korean corporations, increases in domestic interest rates have a major
impact on their financial position. An indication of the cushion firms have in the face of shocks is their interest
coverage. The interest coverage (or the ratio of operating income before interest and taxes to net interest payments)
of Korean corporations has been declining progressively and was estimated at about 135 percent in 1997. By
comparison, interest coverage ratios range from 250450 percent in other OECD countries. It is estimated that a
one percentage point increase in domestic interest rates lowers the interest coverage of Korean corporations by
about 3-4 percentage points within a year. Compounding the effect of sharply higher interest rates, and not
unrelated to interest rates, has been the plunge in domestic demand, which has affected firms on the earnings side.
High indebtedness and the associated deterioration of corporate financial positions have intensified
financial system distress. Financial system non-performing loans have increased rapidly, with the bulk of the
increase in bank loans which account for about half of all corporate debt. Non-performing loans, including those
classifged as such on a precautionary basis, are now approaching 20 percent of all bank loans. In turn, banks, faced
with the need to restructure and recapitalize, have sharply reduced new lending and have had to resort to loan
recalls. Risk premia on lending to corporations also rose, adding to the pressure on interest rates arising from
monetary tightening. The resulting credit crunch has compounded corporate financial problems and depressed
economic activity more generally, with its further negative feedback effects on firms and financial institutions.
Given these linkages between macroeconomic developments and financial and corporate sector
difficulties, an effective policy response to the present Korean crisis requires simultaneous and mutually supporting
actions on all three fronts: macroeconomic policies that mitigate the severity of the recession and support a
recovery of domestic demand (while preserving financial stability); speedy progress on the restructuring and
recapiitalization of the financial system to enable it to resume its financial intermediation role; and a framework to
restructure and reduce corporate debt.
1.8 Projections of inflation have also been subject to downward revision. The plunge in domestic
demand and the build-up of excess capacity, falling wages associated with increased unemployment, and
the recent appreciation of the Won, have darmpened pressures on prices. Indeed, consumer prices have
fallen at an annual rate of 0.6 percent in the past five months, and inflation for 1998 as a whole is now
projected at about 7 percent, down from earlier projections of around 10 percent.
1.9 As stability has returned to the foreign exchange market and inflation pressures have subsided in
recent months, interest rates have come down appreciably from the high levels at the beginning of the year.
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The overnight call rate stood at about 8.5 percent and the three-year corporate bond yield at 12.5 percent in
late September, both rates having declined from peaks of around 30 percent. While this decline is indeed
welcome, real interest rates remain relatively high, given the drop in inflation. Also, for most firms,
especially SMEs, the interest rates actually charged remain much higher. The availability of credit remains
severely constrained for all but the largest firms as financial institutions limit lending to prevent further
deterioration of their portfolios.
1.10 Policies and Prospects. The emphasis in macroeconomic management now needs to be placed on
arresting the decline in domestic demand and paving the way for its revival. This calls for an easing of both
monetary and fiscal policies, while keeping a close watch on financial markets to ensure that the hard-won
gains in stabilization are preserved. This needs to be complemented by pressing ahead decisively with
financial and corporate sector restructuring (structural reform policies are discussed in Section II).
1.11 Monetary policy should utilize the scope for further reductions in interest rates, consistent with
continued stability of the exchange rate. As much of the earlier spike in interest rates has been reversed in
recent months, the scope for further reductions now is correspondingly less, though still important. As
interest rates facing the corporate sector continue to include relatively high risk premia, further reductions
will depend not only on the stance of monetary policy but also on progress made on corporate restructuring.
1.12 There is scope also for moderating the economic downturn through an easing of fiscal policy,
especially considering Korea's relatively low level of public debt. Even though the target budget balance
for 1998 has been progressively relaxed, the fiscal stance remained contractionary in cyclically adjusted
terms during the first half of the year, thereby accentuating the contraction in domestic demand. A new
supplementary budget passed by the National Assembly in August seeks to correct this situation. An
overall central government fiscal deficit of 5 percent of GDP is now projected for 1998, up from a target
deficit of 1.7 percent in April. Even with this increase in the deficit, the fiscal stance would be only
modestly expansionary in cyclically adjusted terms as the operation of automatic stabilizers would imply a
deficit of at least 4 percent of GDP given the projected decline in GDP in 1998. The Government has
committed to adopt contingent fiscal measures in the event the economic downturn proves to be still more
severe, in order to ensure that the fiscal stance remains supportive of aggregate demand. For 1999, the
Government's fiscal plan envisages an overall deficit of 5 percent of GDP, continuing the policy shift
toward a fiscal stimulus.
1.13 The expansion of the budget deficit incorporates a significant further increase in spending on social
safety nets-unemployment benefits, public works, poverty-targeted programs-to cushion the impact of
the crisis on the unemployed and the poor. This increases social safety net outlays in the 1998 budget to
W10.4 trillion (2.5 percent of GDP), a near ten-fold increase over 1997. The Government's fiscal plan for
1999 provides for another significant increase of 45 percent in such outlays (details of social safety net
programs are provided in Section II D). As part of its contingent fiscal planning, the Government has
committed to increase social safety net spending in the event of a further economic slowdown.
1.14 The fiscal stance will also need to be consistent with the fiscal costs associated with financial
system restructuring and recapitalization, which are likely to be large (para 2.20). The 1998 budget
allocates 0.8 percent of GDP for interest costs of bonds issued in connection with financial sector support.
This component is expected to rise in the coming budgets, and could reach around 3 percent of GDP in the
medium term (the Government's fiscal plan for 1999 provides for an allocation of 1.9 percent of GDP for
this component). A challenge for fiscal policy will be to accommodate this outlay within an overall fiscal
stance consistent with broader macroeconomic goals.
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1.15 Provided that Korea adheres to sound macroeconomic policies and makes headway with the
structural reform agenda, it can return to growth in the 5-6 percent range in the medium term, lower than
before the crisis but still robust (see Annex 2, Table 6 for details of medium-tenn macroeconomnic
projections). It is the shorter-term outlook that is subject to greater uncertainty. The uncertainties stem both
from domestic and external factors. Domestic sources of uncertainty include the degree of severity of the
still unLolding economic impact of financial and corporate sector distress, and the political setting which
will influence the speed of policy reforms. Externally, the risks arise from the regional crisis and how it will
evolve in the coming months, especially the situation in Japan, and the still fragile foreign investor
confidence. The response to the domestic risks is to adopt macroeconomic policies more supportive of
domestiic demand as outlined above, including strong social safety net policies that would help maintain the
social and political consensus for refonn, and to proceed resolutely with financial and corporate sector
restructuring. The response to the external risks is partly the same domestic economic policies that build
credibility and enhance foreign investor confidence and partly the attainment of a strong cushion of
international reserves and an improved maturity profile of foreign liabilities coupled with continued
flexibility in exchange rate policy.
1.16 External Financing. Gross usable reserves are targeted to rise to at least $43 billion by year-end,
sufficient to cover short-term external debt. Financing provided by the proposed SAL II is part of the
overall macroeconomic framework agreed with the IMF to achieve the reserve target, and will supplement
financing provided by the IMF and the ADB in the context of the international financing package agreed in
Decem'ber 1997 (see Annex 2, Table 2 for details of external financing requirements). The need for
maintaining a strong reserve position in view of the external risks was emphasized above. The continued
fragility of investor confidence is underlined by the sharp reversal of private portfolio flows from a net
inflow of about $4 billion in the first quarter of 1998 to a net outflow of $3 billion in the second quarter as
market sentiment deteriorated, a development mirrored by the parallel sharp reversal of stock market gains.
Korea also will face a hump in external debt service in the coming year as repayment of some of the $22
billion short-term debt of Korean financial institutions that was restructured in April this year falls due and
Korea makes sizable net repurchases to the IMF. Moreover, the surplus in the current account will decline
sharply as imports recover from their recent sharp contraction. The current account surplus is expected to
drop in 1999 to about one-half of the level projected for 1998.
1.17 Besides these external financial grounds, there is a fiscal case for Bank adjustment financing, in
view of the need to expand the budget deficit to support financial sector restructuring and strengthen social
safety :nets. As noted above, the overall central government fiscal deficit is projected at 5 percent of GDP in
both 1998 and 1999. The fiscal position is likely to remain under pressure in the medium term, as the
deficit is expected to decline only gradually after 1999 (Annex 2, Table 6). Financing the deficit partly
from foreign borrowing would reduce the need for public borrowing from the domestic market and thereby
liniit the risk of putting renewed upward pressure on domestic interest rates and of crowding out the private
sector from a credit market already disinclined to lend to most private firms.
1.18 Korea has so far made purchases of about $18 billion out of a total of about $21 billion provided
under the ongoing IMF stand-by arrangement. The last purchase made was in August, based upon
completion of the third quarterly review under this three-year arrangement.
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II. THE STRUCTURAL REFORM PROGRAM
2.1 In response to the economic crisis, the Korean Government embarked on a major structural reform
program last December. The Bank is supporting this reform program through a series of adjustment loans,
starting with a $3 billion Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL) which was followed by a $2 billion
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I). Substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the
structural reform program, despite a difficult macroeconomic setting and the associated social and political
pressures. The Government has shown a firm resolve to press ahead with reforms, in full recognition that
the response to the crisis must not just deal with its immediate symptoms but address its root causes.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURAL REFORM PROGRAM
2.2 Korea's economic reform program has two central objectives: restoring macrofinancial stability
while limiting the costs to the real economy and the impact on the vulnerable; and strengthening the
economy's structural foundation to lay the basis for resumption of robust and sustained growth. The
achievement of these objectives requires an economic reform program comprising three main elements:
• implementing prudent, responsive macroeconomic policies;
* maintaining the momentum of reforms that address the underlying structural causes of the
crisis, including a radical restructuring of the incentives and institutional framework; and
• strengthening social safety nets.
2.3 Korea's economic record over the past three decades has been impressive, but the recent crisis has
revealed vulnerabilities that must be addressed to prepare Korea for continued success in the next stage of
development. These vulnerabilities arise partly from internal weaknesses and excesses in the Korean
economy-unsound financial system practices and weak regulatory and supervisory framework, high
corporate leverage, failure of corporate governance, excessive government intervention in business, policies
inhibiting competition, wage increases outstripping productivity growth. The vulnerabilities arise also from
external changes that have altered the global context in which the Korean economy operates today-
globalization, increased international mobility and potential volatility of capital, more open and competitive
international trade markets, emergence of major new competitors (especially China, from Korea's
perspective). These changes in the global context both raise potential rewards to reforms that make
countries financially more sound and industrially more competitive, as well as increase the price they must
pay for failure to act.
2.4 Korea needs a radical restructuring of its incentives and institutional framework to overcome these
vulnerabilities and rise to the new challenges, a restructuring that promotes financial system soundness,
fosters more sustainable patterns of corporate financing, increases corporations' exposure to market
discipline, enhances competition (domestic and foreign), and opens up the labor market to increased
flexibility. Such a shift is necessary to restore and sustain financial sector stability, reestablish the
corporate sector's financial viability and increase its efficiency, and recover Korea's competitiveness and
foothold in export markets. The Korean economy has well-known strengths-a large stock of human skills,
technology and industrial capital accumulated over several decades of growth, and strong habits of thrift
and hard work. An improved incentives and institutional framework, more attuned to today's economic
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imperalives, would allow Korea to effectively reengage and redeploy these strengths and reemerge as strong
and successful in the medium term as it has been in the past.
2.5 It is this strategic vision that underpins the medium-term structural reform program that the
Government of Korea has embarked on and is implementing in close cooperation with the World Bank.
SAL I (and the ERL) supported the first stage of this reform program, focusing on three key areas:
financial sector restructuring and development; corporate restructuring and reform of corporate governance
and competition policies; and labor market reform and strengthening of social safety nets. Spanning the
financial and corporate sectors and the labor market, the reform program captures the core of Korea's
restructuring challenges. Its implementation will fundamentally alter the incentives and institutional
framework influencing the behavior of all key actors in the economy-banks, enterprises, labor, policy
makers. At the same time, the program provides for a major strengthening of Korea's system of social
protection, to cushion the impact of the crisis and structural transformation on the poor and the vulnerable.
2.6 A strong start has been made on this reform program under SAL I. The agenda for SAL I provided
for a substantial front-loading of reform. It required a number of key actions to be taken prior to Board
presentation (29 in all), many of which were implemented through a major package of legislation passed by
the National Assembly in February 1998.2 The reform effort has continued since with the implementation
of additional measures envisaged in SAL I.
2.7 The proposed SAL II will support the next stage of the Government's medium-term structural
reform program. It maintains the focus on the same three core areas of reform-financial, corporate and
social sectors-with the objective of deepening and extending the reforms in these areas. SAL II, therefore,
provides continuity with SAL I, and will build on the important progress made under that loan. The
structural reform effort will be underpinned by implementation of macroeconomic policies that are
supporlive of financial stability and restoration of growth (as discussed in the preceding section).
2.8 Details of the specific actions that form part of the structural reform program supported by SAL II
are set Dut in the Policy Matrix attached to the Government's Letter of Development Policy (Annex 1). The
main elements of the reform program are summarized in Box 2. Further elaboration of the reform program
is provided in Sections B-D that follow, linking the SAL II program to the progress made under SAL I.
Within the overall program described in the Policy Matrix, a subset of key actions has been identified as
conditions for Board presentation and second tranche release. These are set out in Section IV A.
2 See the President's Report for SAL I (Report No. P-7225-KO, dated March 19, 1998), especially Box 2.
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Box 2: OVERVIEW OF THE SAL II STRUCrURAL REFORM PROGRAM
Building on the progress made under SAL I, the structural reform program supported by SAL II
comprises the following main elements:
Financial Sector Reform
* Resolution of weak finacial institutions, especially banks, based on agreed timetable and decision criteria on
resolution options and supported by diagnostic reviews and assessment of bank rehabilitation plans.
* Adoption and application of agreed principles and processes for the use of public resources in financial sector
restructuring and recapitalization and the management of acquired assets.
* Enhancement of the independence, authority and institutional capacity of the agency charged with
consolidated supervision of the financial sector-FSC. Strengthening of prudential regulations, especially
those relating to connected lending and large exposures.
* Development of the capital market through encouragement of new institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds)
and asset securitization, standardization of govermnent bond issues, and strengthening of securities market
prudential rules and SROs.
Corporate Sector Reform
* Establishment of a framework for corporate debt workouts led by creditor banks under guidelines established
by FSC and linked to financial sector restructuring. The workout process is supported by policies to limit
"emergency" loans; reduce cross-guaranties; facilitate debt-equity swaps, asset sales, and M&As; remove tax
disincentives; and improve the legal and regulatory enabling environment.
* Strengthening of the responsibilities, independence and accountability of corporate boards, and enhancement
of minority shareholder and institutional investor rights.
* Enhancement of creditors' rights through improvements in insolvency laws focusing on expedited procedures
(including "pre-packaged" workouts) and in laws on secured lending.
* Adoption by financial institutions and corporations of accounting, auditing and reporting standards consistent
with international best practice, introduction of audit committees of boards of directors, and enhancement of
the role of independent professional bodies in standard-setting and regulation in accounting and auditing.
* Enhancement of competition through strengthening the Fair Trade Act and its enforcement; ensuring a
competitive framework for chaebol restructuring; further liberalizing foreign investment; simplifying customs
and certification procedures; and removing restrictions on the establishment of holding companies.
. Improvement of the regulatory and institutional framework to support the Govermment's program of
privatization and SOE reformn, especially in the infrastructure sectors.
Labor Market and Social Safety Nets
. Improvement of labor market flexibility and efficiency, building on the legalization of layoffs earlier in the
year, by reducing restrictions on the use of contract and dispatched workers, strengthening employment
services, and eliminating inefficient active labor market programs.
* Extension of unemployment insurance to firms with fewer than 5 workers while adjusting contribution rates to
maintain financial-viability of the insurance scheme.
* Expansion of the public works program and the provision of means-tested non-contributory income support to
the unemployed poor. Allocation of adequate budgets to other targeted poverty programs. Strengthening of
information base for improved poverty targeting and monitoring.
* Adjustments to health insurance to improve protection of poor beneficiaries and coverage of major financial
risks, and to increase administrative efficiency.
* Reform of pension system including ensuring the adequacy of "social pension" for the elderly poor, and
improving transparency and efficiency of pension fund management and strengthening links to capital market
development.
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B. FiNANCIAL SECTOR REFORM
2.9 Financial sector restructuring remains a centerpiece of the structural reform program supported by
Bank adjustment lending. Building on the progress made under SAL I, the proposed SAL II would support
further actions relating to the restructuring and recapitalization of the banking system, which is now
reaching a critical stage as the Government reviews and decides on the rehabilitation and implementation
plans submitted by the undercapitalized banks, which include several large banks. As a major source of
banks' problems is the overindebtedness of the corporate sector, especially the chaebol, a durable
rehabilitation of the banking system cannot be achieved without a restructuring of the massive corporate
debt and reduction of corporate leverage. It is also clear that while the recent economic shocks have
precipitated the crisis in the financial sector, systemic weaknesses had been developing for some time.
Accordingly, while the resolution of troubled banks is an immediate priority, the reform agenda includes
measures to strengthen bank prudential regulation and supervision, increase competition and improve
governance in order to ensure sound development of the financial system in the future.
2.10 The current challenge facing the Government is therefore enormous, as it must promote the
simultaneous restructuring of the financial and corporate sectors and improve the regulatory and
supervisory regime. At the same time, the Government must pursue the development of the capital market,
which will need to play an important role in the restructuring of corporate debt and fostering a less debt-
intensive and more diversified corporate financial structure.
Resolution of Weak Financial Institutions
2.11 Overall Strategy. The Government has been developing, in consultation with the Bank, an overall
financial sector restructuring strategy. The basic objectives and elements of this strategy are outlined in
Box 3 The strategy takes an integrated view of financial sector problems, including the restructuring of
banks and NBFIs, the related restructuring of corporate debt, and capital market development. To ensure
coordination and high-level attention, the Government has charged a four-member subgroup of the
President's economic council with dealing with the financial sector crisis and developing the overall
strategy. Most of the detailed strategic and operational work has been done by a special structural reform
planning unit within the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). The unit is in charge of developing the
operational strategy and ensuring an adequate institutional infrastructure for implementation.
2.12 Bank Restructuring and Recapitalization. Since SAL I, the Government has made significant
progress in restructuring the Korean banking system. Twelve commercial banks (there were 26 private
commercial banks in all prior to the crisis) that failed to meet the 8 percent capital adequacy standard at
end-1997 were asked to submit rehabilitation plans and subjected to asset quality diagnostic reviews
prepared by the local offices of internationally recognized accounting firrns (with international expert
participation). In accordance with evaluation criteria designed with help from the Bank, these plans were
evaluated by a Bank Appraisal Committee comprising private sector experts. Based on this evaluation, the
FSC amnounced on June 28, 1998 that the rehabilitation plans of 5 of the 12 banks had been deemed
infeasible. These five banks had their business licenses suspended. These banks have since been acquired
by five stronger banks under purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions. The Government has
comm itted to provide adequate public support to ensure that the acquiring banks are not weakened as a
result of the acquisitions.
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Box 3: FINANCIAL SECTOR OnECrIVES AND STRATEGY
* Restore confidence of depositors, creditors and investors: adoption of a comprehensive and credible overall
strategy, and demonstration of progress in implementing the strategy on schedule.
* Restore solvency, profitability, and liquidity of the financial system (especially banks), and build institutional
capacity: resolution of problem banks (including closures where appropriate) proceeding, based on agreed
timetable and supported by diagnostic reviews and assessment of bank rehabilitation plans; significant fiscal
resources allocated in support of approved bank restructuring and recapitalization plans; technical assistance
acquired; rules relating to foreign ownership in financial institutions and M&As liberalized.
* Restore solvency, profitability and liquidity offirms: framework for simultaneous restructuring of the debt of
large corporations put in place, led by major creditor banks and overseen by FSC; measures taken to maintain
SME access to trade financing.
* Strengthen financial sector structure and regulatory framework: under way through adoption of key elements
of Basle Committee's Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, and other efforts to correct long-
standing structural weaknesses; regulations relating to connected lending and large exposures being tightened;
financial sector supervision being strengthened and consolidated under one agency-FSC.
. Adequately and efficiently finance the losses: principles for use of public funds in financial sector
restructuring and recapitalization agreed; need to commit additional public funds agreed.
* Develop the capital market: foreign participation in equity and bond markets liberalized; regulatory and
institutional framework for these markets being strengthened; mutual funds and other institutional investors
important for corporate debt restructuring being encouraged; Government to use the opportunity of large bond
issues for financial sector restructuring to develop a more liquid bond market.
2.13 The remaining seven of the undercapitalized banks received conditional approval. These include
four large banks that account for more than one third of total commercial bank assets (Cho Hung,
Commnercial, Hanil, and Korea Exchange banks). All seven banks were instructed to subrnit revised
implementation plans by end-July containing proposed management changes, cost reductions, capital
increases, and measures to limit the accumulation of non-performiing assets. With Bank support, the FSC
requested additional infornation from these banks in the context of their plans, and provided for further in-
depth analysis utilizing foreign experts. The Government has agreed with the Bank on the objectives and
principles to be used in making decisions on the implementation plans of these banks, including the
provision of government financial support (see Annex 1, pages 12-13). For banks which are subject to
direct recapitalization by the Government, the Government would assume the responsibilities of ownership,
including contracting with experienced senior managers to undertake necessary restructuring, until sale to
strategic investors with sufficient capital and expertise to manage banks.
2.14 Decisions on the implementation plans of these banks, supported by domestic and international
experts, were announced at the end of September. Two of the large banks (Commercial and Hanil) will
merge, and the Government will provide substantial financial support and take up 95 percent ownership
interest in the combined bank. The two other large banks (Cho Hung and Korea Exchange) are currently
negotiating a merger, which, if approved, would also require substantial government financial support. Of
the remaining three banks not meeting the capital requirements, Kangwon Bank likely will merge with a
merchant bank and receive financial support from the Government. The two other small banks will continue
to be monitored for progress on implementation plans including recapitalization. Progress on rehabilitation
measures will determine future government actions.
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2.15 Banks whose implementation plans are approved will enter into a Memorandum of Understanding
with the FSC covering, inter alia, recapitalization and merger plans, measures to manage and reduce non-
perfonming assets, and timetable for achieving agreed performance indicators (including capital adequacy
targets).3 The approval of a bank's implementation plan will require a significant and immediate initial
increase, in capital. Banks whose approved plans are not in the event achieved would be taken over by the
Govermment.
2.16 Diagnostic reviews of the remaining 12 commercial banks are under way and will be completed by
Septemlber 30. The FSC has been receiving technical input from a team of Bank staff and consultants to
support the integrity of this process. If, on the basis of the diagnostic reviews and revised asset
classification and provisioning rules, a bank's BIS-based capital ratio is found to be below 8 percent as of
end-June 1998, FSC will request the bank to submit a rehabilitation plan and will proceed in a manner
similar to that described above for the seven undercapitalized banks.
2.17 The existing shareholders in the two major banks that were intervened last year (Korea First Bank
and Seoul Bank) have been written down below a 10% ownership stake. The Government has initiated the
privatization of these banks, with the objective of attracting foreign capital and expertise into the system.
The preparation for privatization, supported by an investment bank, is well under way. Bids are to be
obtainod by November 15, with completion of the transactions planned by March 31. The Government is
expected to enter into a binding commitment to sell majority ownership interest in at least one of the banks
to the highest qualified bidder by end-December 1998.
2.18 Restructuring of Non-Bank Financial Institutions. The merchant banking sector has been
substantially consolidated. The 14 merchant banks that have been allowed to continue to operate (out of a
pre-crisis total of 30) are subject to a program of intensive supervision, including in-depth diagnostic
reviews where warranted to update assessment of financial condition, determine capital ratio integrity, and
assess compliance with previously approved rehabilitation plans. All of the 14 banks met a capital asset
ratio of 6 percent at end-June. The operating procedures of the Bridge Bank managing the assets of the
closed merchant banks have been clarified.
2.19 Diagnostic reviews have been initiated for specialized and development banks. Progress is also
being nmade in restructuring and rehabilitating other NBFIs that, like banks, have been seriously affected by
the crisis. In general, however, the restructuring process in the case of the NBFIs is at a relatively early
stage. Some such institutions (including investment trust companies, securities brokerage houses, and
insurance companies) have had their licenses revoked. All securities firms, insurance companies, leasing
companies, and investnent trust companies have been asked to submit rehabilitation plans, followed by
review by the FSC and, if necessary, resolution through closure. The timetable for these actions differs
across types of institutions, but submission of rehabilitation plans is generally set for September-October,
with the first round of restructuring expected to follow thereafter.
2.20 Use of Public Resources. The restructuring and recapitalization of the financial system is
expected to be costly. The Government has so far provided for public support of up to W75 trillion (about
3 The performance indicators would include improvements in capital ratios to 6 percent by March 1999 and 8
percent by March 2000 (banks would be encouraged to increase their capital ratios further to 10 percent by
December 2000). For regional or small banks, the targets for capital ratios would be 4 percent by March 1999, 6
percent by March 2000, and 8 percent by December 2000.
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17 percent of GDP), to be financed mainly from bond issues, but the eventual commitment of public
resources is likely to be higher. The financial system's non-performing loans have continued to increase.
Such loans were estimated at W144 trillion at end-June, of which WI 10 trillion were for banks (close to 20
percent of banks' total loans).4 Adequate commitrnent of public resources will be essential to support a
proactive and effective strategy for financial system restructuring and recapitalization.
2.21 Given the prospective high cost, it is all the more important that public funds be used as cost-
effectively as possible. The Government has adopted a set of principles to guide the use of public resources
in financial sector restructuring and recapitalization. Any use of public resources to support financial
institutions will be preceded by rigorous analysis of those institutions and will be conditioned upon those
institutions undertaking substantial operational and financial restructuring. The Government has agreed
that public funds will be used only in the context of FSC-approved rehabilitation and implementation plans,
government akeover of undercapitalized banks, or bank liquidation. Adequate burden-sharing will be
assured either through the write down of existing shareholder capital, in the case of direct recapitalization
by government, or through contribution of new capital by existing or new shareholders in the case of
approved private sector recapitalizations and mergers. The provision of public support will also be
conditioned on adequate progress by banks in implementing sound corporate restructuring, which will be
monitored by FSC (the framework for corporate debt restructuring is detailed in a later section). Moreover,
any private sector acquisition of equity positions in government recapitalized banks will be through a
transparent process and, as much as possible, open bidding. In the context of NBFI resolutions, only
explicitly government-guaranteed liabilities will be covered. In exceptional cases, and in the context of a
comprehensive restructuring plan, support may be provided to NBFIs if failure of these institutions poses a
systemic risk. Under SAL I, the Government agreed to record all public support for financial sector
restructuring on a transparent basis.
2.22 Further policy decisions have been made regarding the role of the Korea Asset Management
Corporation (KAMCO) in the purchase of non-performing loans. Purchases by KAMCO will be at prices
that reflect actual and expected recovery rates as well as the opportunity cost of the funds employed for
collateralized loans, and nominal prices for unsecured loans. The disposition of the troubled assets acquired
by KAMCO will be subject to principles and modalities developed in consultation with the Bank, including
the disposition of a majority of such assets within three years of acquisition. Disclosure of KAMCO's
activities will be enhanced through the publication of semi-annual and annual audited financial statements
(including results of reviews of asset portfolio revaluations). The ongoing program for building KAMCO's
institutional capacity, supported by technical assistance, will be strengthened, to include improved design
and implementation of organizational and operational structures and asset inventory and management
information systems. It has also been agreed that capital injections into banks from the Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation (KDIC) will be on terms that provide the Government with a share in any
improvement in profitability and give the Government powers to take control, e.g., by the exercise of
conversion rights, in the event of a deterioration.
4 Othe WI 10 trillion, W50 trillion is estimated as more than three months overdue and the rest are classified
as precautionary (likely to become non-perfonning).
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Strengthening Supervision and Regulation
2.23 Strengthening the FSC. The basis for a new financial supervisory system was laid with the
establisbnient of FSC in April 1998 as an integrated financial supervision body. Under the new system, all
financial institutions (banks, securities, insurance and other NBFIs) will be supervised by the FSC and its
executing body, the Financial Supervisory Board (FSB). The reform schedule calls for all four existing
supervisory agencies (Banking Supervisory Authority, Securities Supervision Board, Insurance
Supervisory Board, and the Non-Bank Financial Institution Supervisory Authority) to be fully integrated
into the FSB by end-1998. The Government recognizes that independence and freedom to act without
political interference are essential for a supervisory agency to effectively performn its role of ensuring the
soundness of the financial system. While increased independence had been provided through the legislation
establishing the FSC, the Government will take additional steps to enhance FSC's independence and
authority, consistent with the Basle Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. This
includes ensuring operational independence and adequate funding. A legal framework will be established
through which FSB may assess fees on supervised institutions, with revenues dedicated to the operations of
FSB. Thle issuance and revocation of financial institutions' licenses will henceforth be carried out upon the
recommendation of FSC. The governance structure of the FSC will be reviewed to enhance its
independence and effectiveness, including through increased representation of individuals nominated by
independent professional associations.
2.24 With the consolidation of supervisory organizations, supervisory arrangements for commercial
banks will be extended to all NBFIs. The FSC will also be authorized to conduct examinations and
recommend supervisory actions against specialized and development banks, and prudential rules applied to
commercial banks will be extended to these banks taking into account their specific characteristics.
Effective performance of enhanced, consolidated supervision will require institutional strengthening of
FSC. A strategic blueprint for FSC's institutional strengthening has been prepared. Supported by technical
assistan,ce, qualified consulting firms will be employed to assist in its implementation.
2.25 Upgrading Regulation. Since SAL I, the Government has strengthened the regulatory framework
to conform more closely to international norms. Changes have been made in the following dimensions:
mark-to-market accounting, disclosure of non-performing loans, asset classification criteria, and foreign
exchange liquidity and exposure criteria. On July 1, 1998, additional prudential regulations and reporting
requirernents were announced covering: loan classification and provisioning, accounting and disclosure of
trust accounts, and short-term foreign borrowing and foreign exchange exposures. Limits on connected
lending that apply to commercial banks (25 percent of equity capital) will be extended to merchant banks,
and full disclosure will be required of such lending. To reduce large exposures, single borrower and group
exposure limits for commercial banks, redefined to include all off-balance sheet exposures, will be reduced
from 45 to 25 percent of total capital as of end-June 2000 (from 100 to 25 percent in the case of merchant
banks), with a phased reduction of exposures in excess of these limits. The aggregate of exposures in
excess of 10 percent of total capital will be limited to 500 percent. The Financial Restructuring Act has
been amnended, inter alia, to redefine a "distressed" financial institution so as to allow imposition of
sanctions before actual insolvency is reached and the full write down of shareholder equity. To facilitate
corporate debt restructuring, the FSC will issue further guidelines on the treatment of restructured debt and
workoult processes and asset management in banks.
2.26 Deposit insurance has been improved through its consolidation in one agency (KDIC). The
Government has initiated a narrowing of the present general protection. All deposits made until July 31,
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1998 are fully protected until the year 2000. Under a revised deposit protection law, for deposits made after
August 1, 1998, only the principal will be guaranteed until 2000 if the amount exceeds W20 million (both
principal and interest will be guaranteed for smaller deposits).
Capital Market Development
2.27 The Government is keen on developing the capital market to support the restructuring of corporate
finances away from debt and also reduce the burden of corporate financing and associated risk thus far
carried by the banking system. Most restrictions on foreign investrnent in listed securities have now been
removed. The ceiling on foreign ownership of listed stocks, 26 percent pre-crisis, has been eliminated
altogether. Both ERL and SAL I supported this major liberalization. Foreign equity investrnent in non-
listed companies is also now allowed. Under SAL I, task forces were established to review the functioning
of the bond and equity markets and several steps taken to improve the regulatory framework for these
markets. Building on the progress made, and based on recommendations of the task forces, SAL II will
support further actions to expand and deepen the bond and equity markets.
2.28 While Korea's organized trading markets have attained respectable operational sophistication, the
highly concentrated market structure and the resulting lack of competition have led to a high cost structure.
Heavy regulatory control and lack of exposure to external competition have inhibited commercial
sensitivity on the part of the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and other market agencies, while the ownership
structure of the clearing and settlement institution (KSD) has hampered its service. To promote greater
inter-market competition, a new regulatory framework is necessary, providing greater independence to
market institutions (e.g., KSE, KSDA, KITCA). The SAL II program will therefore support the reform of
the governance structure of these agencies. Korea's securities industry has attained the maturity where
enhanced self-regulation, with appropriate oversight, will bring greater trust to investors, lead to more self-
discipline, and promote more spontaneous growth. The program proposes that FSC delegate to the
securities market agencies increased authority to regulate and supervise their members (with FSC retaining
adequate regulatory and supervisory power over these agencies themselves). It also calls for strengthening
prudential rules for securities market activities-standards for risk management, adoption of mark-to-
market accounting, use of credit rating. Inprovements in financial disclosure and minority shareholder
rights, discussed later in the section on corporate governance, will also support securities market
development by enhancing investor confidence.
2.29 Progress is being made in developing a more liquid and active bond market. Treasury auctions
have become more market-based and fuller information is provided to the market. The Government is
putting in place the institutional setup to develop a clear, comprehensive new funding strategy, covering a
rolling three-year period and including financing of the costs associated with financial sector restructuring.
Within this framework, the development of the government bond market, which serves as a benchmark for
the private bond market, will be pursued through a standardization of new securities issued by government
and government agencies, consolidation of existing instruments, and phasing out of the issuance of
government-guaranteed KAMCO and KDIC bonds in favor of direct issuance by government. The creation
of a market-makers' network, producing more liquid secondary markets, will be supported by adopting
clear rules for the selection of primary dealers in government bonds and authorizing banks to act as market
makers. To help implement this agenda, the Treasury Division of the Ministry of Finance will be
institutionally strengthened, supported by technical assistance.
2.30 The development of the domestic bond market needs to be an integral element of public asset-
liability management (ALM). Supported by SAL I, the Government has established an external debt
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management office, and the development of an ALM system for external debt is underway. Under SAL II,
and supported by technical assistance, this will be expanded into an overall ALM framework, incorporating
domestic public debt and contingent liabilities. Such an integrated public ALM framework would permit
better coordination between government borrowing strategy, risk management, and the development of
domestic bond market.
2.31 ]Institutional investors will need to play an important role in the restructuring of corporate debt.
SAL II will support the strengthening of the institutional investor base through changes in the legal and
regulatory framework allowing the establishment of mutual funds and other corporate restructuring
vehicles (see also para. 2.43). Improvements in the management of pension system reserves conducive to
capital market development are underway (see section on pension reform). Financial and corporate sector
restructuring will be facilitated also by legislation allowing the issuance of asset-backed securities. To
facilitate asset sales, legal restrictions on foreign ownership of land and real estate properties have been
removed.
C. CORPORATE SECTOR REFORM
2.32 A key priority is to accelerate the process of corporate debt restructuring. Corporate debt is
estimated on the order of $500 billion (about 150 percent of GDP), 90 percent of which is domestic, and
for large corporations amounts on average to as high as five times their equity. This heavy debt burden, a
substantxial nd increasing part of which is now of a problem status, is a major reason for the current deep
and widespread distress in the corporate sector. Lowering this high corporate leverage is essential to
corporate revival and reducing corporate vulnerability to future shocks. As noted in the preceding section,
restructu ring corporate debt is also essential to successful financial sector restructuring.
2.33 To restore, and maintain, viability and competitiveness, Korean firms need both financial and real
restructuring. The latter requires improvements in the governance of firms and increased exposure to
competitive pressures. Accordingly, the corporate sector reform agenda of SAL II comprises both
corporate debt restructuring and improvements in corporate governance and competition policies, building
on actions taken under SAL I. It also includes the privatization and reform of state corporations, especially
the promotion of competition and private entry in the monopolized infrastructure sectors.
Corporate Financial Restructuring
2.34 'Excessive corporate indebtedness amongst the major corporate groups known as chaebol has been
an important factor contributing to the current economic crisis in Korea. Over the last several decades,
these major groups have expanded via a very aggressive use of leveraging, borrowing from Korean
commercial and merchant banks, often short term, to finance fixed or long-term investments. Although
most of the major subsidiaries of the largest groups are publicly listed, the Korean stock market is thinly
capitalized, especially when compared to other economies that are comparable to Korea's, and the groups
have traditionally raised little in new equity. The Government supported this expansion and often directed
the chaebol into specific lines of business. Government licensing was the mechanism used to control entry
into a new sector. Borrowing was assured if the groups adhered to government guidance. Banks allocated
credit to the large corporations relying on real collateral and a very complex system of cross guarantees
from affiliates within the group, as well as personal guarantees from group executives. Relatively little
attention was paid to the earnings performance and cash flow generation of their borrowers, that is their
ability to repay. The five largest chaebol absorbed about 40 percent of all credits provided by commercial
banks.
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2.35 This policy of aggressive leveraged expansion worked well as long as the economy expanded
vigorously and returns on new investments exceeded their cost of capital. In recent years, however, all
measures of group financial performance among the 30 largest chaebol have worsened-free cash flow,
return on equity, profit margin, return on assets, debt coverage ratio-while their debt/equity ratios have
continued to rise. The debt/equity ratio of these groups far exceeded prudent levels and by end-1997 had
reached an average of over 500 percent (600 percent if the debt of their financial subsidiaries is included).
2.36 With the onset of the economic crisis in 1997 and the spike in interest rates, five major groups with
about $20 billion in assets quickly failed, unable to pay their debts. At least five additional large groups
have petitioned for bankruptcy since then. Moreover, it soon became apparent that 18 of the largest 30
groups were at risk of bankruptcy, with combined liabilities of about $75 billion. Not surprisingly, a series
of syndicated emergency loans were provided by major banks to a number of major groups at risk, totaling
some W2.5 trillion.
2.37 The problems of the largest groups quickly spread to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Many
of these SMEs operate as satellites of the major groups, dependent on them for business. Also, a complex
system of payments from the big to small firns via prornissory notes, traditionally discounted at banks,
adversely affected the liquidity of the latter as the terms of the notes were extended from an average of 30-
60 days to 90-180 days and discounting rates rose from 12 to 25-30 percent, if in fact the banks would
discount the notes at all. Moreover, SMEs that exported found it very difficult to finance imports of needed
raw material. A large number of SMEs have gone bankrupt. The Government has taken steps to assist
SMEs (para. 1.7), but their recovery will also hinge importantly on the resolution of the problems of the
larger firrns.
2.38 There is an urgent need for corporate restructuring, especially among Korea's major groups or
chaebol. As the highest priority, the chaebol need to restructure their balance sheets, increasing their equity
and improving the maturity profile of their debt. Also, a longer-term process of real restructuring needs to
occur, including improved corporate govemance, product line rationalization, increases in productivity, and
a fundarnental change in corporate strategies and culture which focuses on profitability and liquidity versus
aggressive expansion at virtually any cost. The first step is financial restructuring, which is necessary for
the recovery of the financially distressed but viable corporations. Reducing debt/equity ratios is essential
also to the future financial health of Korea's corporations, as continued high leverage would mean
continued vulnerability to future financial shocks. The restructuring of corporate finances is closely related
to banking sector restructuring and recapitalization. Without resolving the problem corporate loans and
reducing corporate leverage, a durable resolution of the banking system problems will be difficult to
achieve and bank recapitalization will likely need to be repeated.
2.39 The Government's strategy for corporate financial restructuring comprises four, related elements:
(a) improving the enabling environment-changes in the legal, regulatory and institutional
framework that facilitate debt restructuring and reduction of leverage;
(b) supporting the restructuring and recapitalization of creditor banks;
(c) developing the capital market; and
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(d) establishing a framework for workouts of corporate debt.5
2.40 The first three elements of this strategy have already been under implementation. (a) Supported by
SAL I, siignificant actions have been taken to improve the enabling environment for corporate restructuring,
including liberalization of foreign investment in stocks and bonds, clarification and liberalization of rules
for M&As including permitting foreign investors to undertake hostile takeovers, granting of tax incentives,
e.g., on asset sales, liberalization of the real estate market to foreigners, improvements in financial
disclosure and reporting, improvements in insolvency procedures, and facilitation of labor redeployment
through legalization of worker layoffs and improvements in unemployment insurance. (b) The process of
bank restructuring and recapitalization is well under way, which will support banks' efforts to work out
claims on their corporate clients. The strengthening of banks' capital and management is essential to the
success of the bank-led corporate debt restructuring framework that has been put in place (see below). The
provision of public support for bank recapitalization will be related, among other criteria, to progress banks
are making in restructuring corporate debt. To facilitate debt-equity swaps, the ceiling on banks' ownership
of other firms' equity has been raised. New, clearer guidelines have been issued on prudential and tax
treatment of restructured corporate debt. Prudential regulations relating to connected lending and large
exposures are being tightened. (c) The magnitude of corporate overindebtedness is such that the problem
cannot be resolved through debt restructuring and equity swaps with banks alone. The capital market,
especially the equity market, must be mobilized aggressively. SAL I supported several measures to develop
the equity and bond markets. Additional measures, such as legal changes facilitating the establishment of
mutual and venture capital funds and issuance of asset-backed securities, form part of the SAL II program.
2.41 IDetails of measures under items (a) to (c) above are provided in respective sections elsewhere in
this report. This section focuses on item (d), measures that deal more directly with the problem of
corporatel overindebtedness by facilitating debt workouts between the corporations and their creditors.
Supported by the proposed SAL II, and the complementary technical assistance loan (FCRAL), a
framework for such workouts has been established and its main elements are described below.
2.42 ]Framework for Debt Workouts. The FSC has been charged with the responsibility to develop
and oversee a framework for corporate workouts, related to financial system restructuring. This framework
has now been established and focuses on a program of voluntary workouts between banks and non-bank
financial institutions and major corporations utilizing the "London Rules." The London Rules basically call
for extra-judicial resolution of problem debtors. A Corporate Restructuring Agreement (CRA) has been
signed by some 200 Korean banks and non-bank financial institutions which commits them to follow agreed
workout procedures. Eight major creditor banks identified as Lead Banks will take the responsibility for
negotiating workouts with the 64 major corporate groups. Each of the banks has forned a Workout Unit
which will be supported by external financial advisors, financed by the Bank's technical assistance loan
(FCRAL). In the event the financial institutions cannot agree on a workout strategy among themselves or
the Lea1 Bank and the debtor cannot reach agreement, an arbitration committee, the Corporate
Restructaring Coordination Committee, has been created to resolve such differences. If a CRA signatory
fails to comply with an approved workout agreement or CRCC arbitration decision, the CRCC has the
Also relevant, in addition to these elements, is of course macroeconomic management that would permit a
further lowering of interest rates and a recovery of domestic demand consistent with preservation of external
financial stability, thereby favorably affecting corporate finances.
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power to impose penalties. The FSC will monitor the workouts agreed under the CRA to ensure
consistency with the guidelines issued for the workouts.
2.43 Supportive Policies. The Government has agreed to undertake a series of policy measures to
support the debt restructuring process. These include the following:
(a) Curtailing "Emergency" or "Rescue" Loans. The Government has agreed not to direct
banks to make emergency syndicated loans to troubled debtors in the future (which had the
effect of delaying the needed debt restructuring). It has agreed that fresh capital would be
provided to financially distressed but viable corporations normally only in the context of
the workout process, and subject to guidelines that limit the amount, require debtors to
allow complete creditor access to their records, and require a financial assessment by the
Lead Bank's advisors of the debtor's financial viability. In exceptional cases, corporations
not in the process of a workout, but due to be restructured, may be provided new loans, if
the banks are willing, but subject to the same guidelines, and for a maximum period of six
months which should provide sufficient time to establish a CRA workout. The incentive
for corporations to restructure is the promise of fresh capital, and the penalty of a cut-off
of new financing for failure to restructure.
(b) Facilitating Debt/Equity Conversions. The stock of corporate debt is so large that
sustainable debt/equity ratios cannot be achieved over a reasonable time frame only
through the flow of new equity, asset sales and retirement of debt. In addition to such
flows, stock adjustments in the form of conversion of debt into equity will be necessary.
The Government will remove regulatory and tax disincentives to debt/equity conversions
so that this instrument can be fully utilized in the corporate workout process. Because
banks can hold only so much corporate equity, and may be ill-prepared to manage
converted equity, corporate restructuring vehicles (CRVs) will need to play an important
role in purchasing and/or managing converted equity. The CRVs, e.g., trusts or mutual
funds, might operate by purchasing converted equity from the banks, managing converted
equity for a fee, or purchasing debt and converting it into equity. The CRVs would be
privately owned and managed. The Government has undertaken to review the tax and
regulatory regime to remove any barriers that may exist to the establishment and operation
of such vehicles.
(c) Reducing Cross Guarantees. The chaebol have generally supplied guarantees to their
affiliates and subsidiaries to secure loans. This has created a very complex pattern of
cross-linked guarantees which is difficult to isolate and unwind. Cross guaranties allow
loss-making affiliates to continue to borrow from banks and drain financial resources from
healthier affiliates. They, therefore, both postpone reckoning for non-viable affiliates and
compromise the financial health of the whole group. Under a law passed in April, the
Government prohibited new cross guarantees and required that all existing guarantees be
unwound by April 2000. The FSC is encouraging banks to reduce cross guarantees
through the workout process, and is proposing market-based approaches to unwind these
guarantees, such as exchanging the guarantees for equity or warrants. The FSC has
required financial institutions to report on the stock of guarantees as of end-June, 1998,
and to submit quarterly progress reports on reducing these guaranties. The FSC will also
establish benchmarks for monitoring this progress.
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(d) Other Policy Measures. The Government will submit to the National Assembly tax
measures to encourage corporate M&As, debt restructuring and asset sales. It will also
propose changes to insolvency procedures to expedite court-supervised insolvency (details
in the section on legal framework for creditors' rights). The Korea Fair Trade Commission
(KFTC) will step up its investigation and monitoring of illegal intra-chaebol financial
transfers to weaker affiliates. Recently, the KFTC imposed stiff fines on the major chaebol
found to have engaged in such transfers.
2.44 Implementation Process. An accelerated implementation of corporate restructuring will be
supported through several measures. (i) A special task force of four Lead Banks will focus attention on the
top five chaebol. It will monitor their capital structure imnprovement plans, submitted under guidelines
provided by the FSC, and identify affiliates to be restructured or liquidated. The banks have recently
submittecd to the FSC a list of about 25 subsidiaries of the top five chaebol that they have identified as
candidates for liquidation. (ii) Of the chaebol ranked 6-64 in size, the FSC has asked banks to identify 16
initially and proceed with inter-creditor agreements leading to CRA workouts. (iii) The FSC has directed
banks to halt and withdraw financing in the case of the 55 companies that were declared non-viable in June,
and to provide monthly reports on progress in exiting these companies and on additional companies
identified to be non-viable. (iv) The FSC has directed the Lead Banks to send auditors into chaebol
affiliates that have received emergency loans to assess their financial position and recommend action within
two months. Not surprisingly, companies that have received emergency loans figure prominently in the first
16 chaebol to be restructured. (v) The FSC has required Lead Banks and the CRCC to submit monthly
reports on the status of corporate workouts. (vi) The resolution of firms under court supervision where the
Government is a major shareholder is being expedited (Kia Motors, Hanbo Steel). (vii) A "situation room"
has been created within FSC to monitor the financial performance of chaebol and provide early detection of
insolvency or default.
Corporate Governance
2.45 T'he economic crisis in Korea is partly a consequence of the failure of corporate governance. The
normal disciplines capable of containing risky corporate behavior-close monitoring by boards of directors
and shareholders, effective regulation based on reliable information, and the threat of bankruptcy-had
been largely absent.
2.46 Corporate Boards and Shareholder Rights. Directors and minority shareholders need to play a
more active role as monitors of corporate performance. In the past, boards of directors of large companies
were domiinated by insiders, had diffuse responsibility, and tended to be passive supporters of the wishes of
controlling shareholders. As Korea seeks to restructure and modernize its corporate sector, a fundamental
change vwill be needed in the role of corporate boards in order to improve their effectiveness and
accountability to shareholders. SAL I required that outside directors be included on the boards of all listed
companies and banks, and under SAL II their representation on the boards has been increased to a
minimum of 25 percent. Changes will be made in the Commercial Code to impose on directors and
"shadow" directors clear responsibilities to the company and shareholders.
2.47 Minority shareholder ights have been strengthened. Under SAL I, the threshold for the exercise of
such rights, e.g., the right to convene a shareholders' meeting and to make proposals at a meeting and
inspect company records, had been lowered. These thresholds will be lowered further under SAL II.
Minority shareholders will be given a greater say in the election of directors and in the conduct of company
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business. Steps will be taken toward allowing class action law suits by shareholders of listed companies.
Also, restrictions on the voting rights of institutional investors will be removed.
2.48 Legal Framework for Creditors' Rights. A consequence of the prospective corporate
restructuring will be a sharp increase in filings under the insolvency laws. While the laws are basically
sound, and were improved under SAL I, further improvements are desirable in view of the extraordinary
demands likely to be placed on the insolvency system. The reorganization option is rarely used, as it results
in the immediate displacement of the existing management. As a result, debtors have little incentive to file
at an early stage of liquidity difficulties when viable restructuring may be feasible. The process is also
complex and requires intensive court involvement. Further streamlining and simplification of procedures
will assist the courts to deal effectively with their increased workload. In particular, laws need to be
changed to encourage informal workout agreements between debtors and creditors. While informal
workouts can be conducted entirely outside the court system, there is no moratorium protection available in
those circumstances beyond a voluntary moratorium agreed between specific creditors and a debtor. The
reorganization option is not well suited to a pre-negotiated workout while the composition option is
unavailable to larger firms. One possible reform is the "pre-packaged" bankruptcy plan that can be readily
approved by the court based on standards as to the adequacy of financial disclosure to creditors during the
workout negotiations. Under SAL II, legislation will be introduced to make further improvements in the
insolvency laws along these lines, including changes to facilitate "pre-packaged" workouts.
2.49 The insolvency (bankruptcy, reorganization or composition) proceedings are dealt with at the
District Court level, with limited rights of appeal to the Supreme Court. While some District Court judges
have become relatively skilled in handling these cases, there are only a few judges assigned predominantly
to insolvency work. This suggests the need to establish specialist courts to handle the expected upturn in
insolvency filings. SAL 1[ envisages the establishment of a pilot specialist bankruptcy court in Seoul with
dedicated judges.
2.50 As reforms of the financial system proceed, it will be important to consider complementary reforms
to expand the range of available lending instruments. Small and medium-size enterprises are especially
vulnerable to ongoing changes in the traditional credit market. While the promissory note system has been
the mainstay of SME financing of working capital needs, the collapse of the merchant banking sector has
largely eliminated this source of funds. Since SMEs are unlikely to have significant real estate or other
fixed assets available to be collateralized, they must rely on inventory and book debts as security for their
lenders. Korean law does not permit a modern system of secured lending on inventory and book debts to
develop. The law recognizes only simple forms of security based either on pledge or the transfer of title of
specified assets to the creditor. There is no means of giving security over a revolving pool of assets such as
inventory or book debts. And there is no national registry system that would allow lenders to identify
whether assets are available to be charged. The Government will accordingly prepare legal and institutional
changes necessary to facilitate secured lending on movables.
2.51 Financial Transparency and Accountability. The program provides for far-reaching reforms in
accounting, auditing and reporting that should contribute greatly to enhancing financial transparency and
accountability and instilling increased market confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and
disclosure. The reform agenda, initiated under SAL I, comprises the following main elements: rationalizing
the institutional framework for standard-setting, regulation and oversight in accounting and auditing;
upgrading accounting and auditing standards to international best practice; increasing financial oversight
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by boards of directors and strengthening the internal audit function; and improving the quality and
frequency of financial reporting.
2.52 Actions to rationalize the institutional framework for accounting and auditing will include:
consolidating appropriate government regulatory authority in one agency-the Securities Supervisory
Board; enhancing the role of an independent and self-regulating professional body (KICPA) in the
regulation and monitoring of the profession and issuance of auditing standards; and setting up an
independent accounting standard setting organization. To give effect to this reform, a time-bound
implementation plan will be adopted to amend applicable laws and regulations, remove barriers to
competition in the profession, and institutionally strengthen the KICPA.
2.53 Under SAL I, the Government announced that financial statements of listed companies, banks and
other financial institutions, as well as joint stock companies with assets in excess of W7 billion will be
preparecl and audited in accordance with standards consistent with international best practice beginning in
1999. The new and improved accounting standards, consistent with international best practice and prepared
with participation of representatives of internationally recognized accounting firms, will be issued by
December, covering inter alia: asset classification, loss and income recognition, troubled debt
restructuring, financial statement disclosure, combined financial statements, financial instruments, leases,
revaluation of assets, and translation of foreign currencies. Revised auditing standards will also be issued.
2.54 Financial oversight of management performance has been weak. Boards of directors need to play a
more active role in enhancing the integrity of the financial reporting process, overseeing the operation of
internal control, and ensuring a comprehensive and unbiased audit by an independent auditor. To strengthen
the independence and effectiveness of internal and external audit, a study was initiated under SAL I on the
introduction of audit committees of boards of directors in listed companies. As the next step, SAL II
envisages the adoption of a time-bound implementation plan for the establishment of such committees
consistenit with international best practice. In the interim, it calls for improvements in the existing audit
selection. committees to make them more independent and transparent.
2.55 Alongside improved quality, increased frequency of financial reporting will allow investors,
creditors and regulators to better monitor firms' performance. Listed companies have been required to
publish half-yearly audited financial statements. Beginning with the first quarter of the year 2000, listed
companies will be required also to publish quarterly financial statements. For commercial banks, this
requirement will come into effect in the third quarter of 1999.
2.56 The Bank is also supporting efforts to promote transparency and good governance by limiting the
scope for corruption. An IDF grant will support a streamlining of regulations and procedures to reduce the
opportunities for corruption that arise from excessive regulation. It will also support a rationalization and
strengthening of institutions concemed with the prevention of corruption, and enhancement of the code of
conduct for civil servants.
Competition Policies
2.57 Shielded from adequate exposure to competition in the past, the Korean industrial sector is highly
concentrated and has seen its productivity performance and competitiveness decline. Korea first enacted the
Fair Trade Act (FTA) in 1981 but it has generally been ineffective in enhancing domestic competition. The
Government controlled many aspects of the economy and directed it through measures such as price
controls, credit rationing, barriers to foreign investment and other policies limiting competition. These
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distortions played a role in firms making risky investment decisions and becoming sluggish in their
response to changing global market conditions. Only relatively recently has Korea taken steps to lower
trade and investment barriers and to enhance the powers of the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to
limit anti-competitive practices.
2.58 SAL I included a set of measures to strengthen competition policies. While progress has been made
in implementing that program, especially in liberalizing the foreign investment regime, implementation of
some other measures-those relating to the strengthening of the FTA and KFTC-has been slower than
envisaged. SAL II aims to accelerate and deepen reforms to enhance competition.
2.59 Strengthening the Fair Trade Act. Central to the enhancement of domestic competition is the
strengthening of the FTA and its transparent and effective application. As provided for under SAL I, the
Government has completed a detailed review of the FTA through a Joint Public/Private Sector Committee
to formulate amendments to the FTA and identify measures which would strengthen the FTA's market
efficiency objectives, make its provisions fully and uniformly applicable to all economic sectors, including
public entities, and increase the KFTC's investigative and sanctions powers. Delay in the completion of the
review put back the timetable for the enactment of amendments to the FTA that were to be based on the
Committee's recommendations. These amendments to the FTA will now be enacted later this year as part
of the SAL II program.
2.60 The Government has agreed to strengthen the enforcement of rules limiting non-arms length
transactions between related corporations, companies, financial institutions, their owners, directors,
shareholders and employees. It has agreed to apply existing laws stringently and uniformly, and to propose
amendments to the FTA to further limit such transactions. In addition, the Government has agreed to enact
an Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels. It will also review and propose amendments to
government procurement guidelines to improve transparency.
2.61 Providing a Competitive Framework for Corporate Restructuring. The KFTC is mandated
under the FTA to play a major role in the restructuring of the Korean corporate sector. Per SAL I
commitments, the Government issued a policy statement announcing various measures to ensure full
enforcement of the provisions of the FTA to the restructuring of the chaebol. These measures include:
prohibiting business combinations which substantially reduce competition in a given market; fostering the
entry of new domestic or foreign firms in the divestment of chaebol operations; and disseminating
information. The KFTC has issued comprehensive M&A guidelines and will closely monitor compliance,
especially in chaebol restructuring.
2.62 Allowing the Establishment of Holding Companies. Legislation will be enacted to remove
current restrictions under the FTA on the creation of holding companies to permit such structures subject to
conditions to avoid undue ownership concentration. This change will allow the replacement of the present
opaque ownership structures of large business groups (the chaebol) with a more transparent system, with
greater clarity of rights and obligations within groups.
2.63 Liberalizing Foreign Investment and Trade Regime. The ceiling on foreign investment in listed
stocks, raised from 26 to 55 percent earlier in the year, has now been lifted altogether, ahead of program
schedule. This opens the way for 100 percent foreign ownership of listed Korean companies. A new
Foreign Investment Promotion Act aimed at encouraging FDI has been enacted which will simplify
approval and registration procedures and move toward national treatment of foreign enterprises, establish a
one-stop shop, provide tax incentives, facilitate leasing of public property, and allow the establishment of
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Foreign Investment Zones. Foreign participation in M&As has been liberalized, including allowing foreign
investors to undertake hostile takeovers.
2.64 Cumbersome customs administration and drawn-out product certification/registration have been a
major bloc to import competition. They have also been a factor frustrating FDI. The Government has now
agreed to review customs clearance and product certification/registration procedures and develop and
implement a plan to streamline them.
2.65 Furthering Industrial Deregulation. In addition to the foregoing improvements in competition
policies that have an impact across industries, attention is being given to removing barriers to entry and
other distortions that impede competition within specific sectors or industries. A Deregulation Committee
coordinated by the Prime Minister's Office is leading this reform. Several industry studies have been
commissioned by this Committee which will formn the basis for implementing necessary legislative or
regulatoiy changes.
2.66 Strengthening the Korean Fair Trade Commission. Effective implementation of the competition
policy agenda will require substantial institutional strengthening of the KFTC. SAL I identified several
actions in this regard-the strengthening of policy analysis and evaluation capacity, provision of timely
information to the market, enhancement of operational capacity and transparency-on which progress so
far has been rather slow but is beginning to pick up. The institutional strengthening effort will be continued
under SAL II within an agreed work plan, including the development of detailed operational guidelines.
This will be supported by provision of technical assistance through the FCRAL.
Reform and Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises
2.67 The ongoing reform of the corporate sector extends to state corporations. Korea has some 26
"parent" state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with a total of 82 subsidiaries. As part of its broader reform
program, and to release resources to facilitate other structural reforns, the Government has initiated a
major reform of its SOEs. This reform, that SAL II would support, is based on five main principles:
activities that are better performed by the private sector are to be privatized or contracted out; de-
monopolization is to be pursued through deregulation and other means; SOEs are to be restructured to
redirect their resources to "core" businesses; corporate governance structures are to be revised to give
greater autonomy to management while enhancing accountability; and corporate transparency is to be
enhanced through publication of performance indices and adoption of internationally accepted accounting
principles.
2.68 SOE Restructuring and Governance Reforms. SOEs that are to remain under state control or
are to be privatized gradually will be subject to comprehensive restructuring to improve efficiency and
accountability. At present, Korea's SOEs fall within two categories: "state-capitalized" enterprises (SCEs),
in which the Government owns more than 50 percent of the equity and which are subject to the SCE
Management Act; and "state-invested" enterprises (SIEs), in which the Government usually owns less than
50 percenlt of the equity and which are not subject to any special law. SOEs report to relevant sector
ministries, which have used enterprises to pursue diverse non-commercial objectives. The Government
recognizes the need to reform these arrangements, and will make necessary changes to the SCE
Management Act.
2.69 General Privatization Program. In July, the Government announced its privatization plans for
one SCE (Korea Electric Power) and ten SIEs (Korea Telecom, Korea Tobacco and Ginseng, Pohang Iron
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and Steel, Korea Heavy Industries and Construction, Korea Gas, Korea General Chemistry, National
Textbook, Korea Technology Banking, Daehan Oil Pipeline, and Korea District Heating). Details of the
privatization and restructuring plans of these SOEs are summarized in Annex 2, Table 8; plans for some
other SOEs are to be announced shortly. The implementation of the privatization program has been
entrusted to a steering committee chaired by the Planning and Budget Commission and comprising officials
of relevant line ministries. The steering committee will oversee the work of task forces established by each
relevant line ministry. The task forces will also be responsible for studying and proposing changes to the
existing regulatory framework.
2.70 Privatization of Infrastructure Enterprises. Several of the enterprises included in the July 1998
announcement are major infrastructure enterprises. While international experience confirns the potential
efficiency benefits of infrastructure privatization, it also provides important lessons on the challenges
involved. The SAL policy conditions, which focus on ensuring a sound regulatory and institutional
framework for privatization, emphasize three key lessons. First, it is important to implement pro-
competition structural and regulatory reform before privatization. While infrastructure sectors have
traditionally been viewed as "natural" monopolies, it is. possible to introduce competition in many activities,
by removing regulatory barriers and restructuring incumbent enterprises. Such reforms are complex, but
become still more difficult to implement once private property rights are involved. While Korea's
telecommunications sector has been progressively liberalized, the power and gas sectors are dominated by
large vertically-integrated monopolies. In power, the Government plans to restructure the industry by end-
October 1998, before offering for sale a tranche of KEPCO shares by end-1998 and selling thermal power
plants in 1999. Given the complexities of transition to a competitive power industry, this is an ambitious
timetable. In gas, the Government plans to introduce an open access system by 2000 but complete a public
offering in KOGAS by 1999. Again, this may prove ambitious. The Bank's advice in the SAL franework
will be to ensure that the necessary pro-competition reforms and restructuring occur before the proposed
privatization transactions and that the timetable is consistent with that.
2.71 Second, clearly defined rules that support investment, protect consumers and promote efficiency
need to be established before privatization. Infrastructure enterprises that enjoy some degree of monopoly
are typically subject to a range of industry-specific rules governing pricing, service quality, interconnection,
and other matters. To support private investment, the rules need to assure investors of the opportunity to
recover commercial returns. Rules also need to protect consumers from potential misuse of monopoly
power and promote efficiency in investment, operation and final consumption. The rules governing Korea's
infrastructure enterprises require substantial revision to meet these goals. In telecommunications, particular
attention needs to be given to rules governing tariff rebalancing, interconnection arrangements, and the
establishment of an efficient and equitable mechanism for financing universal service obligations. In power
and gas, substantial revision of existing rules will be needed, to permit the introduction of more competitive
market arrangements and of pricing structures that support efficient investment.
2.72 Third, it is increasingly recognized that the administration of regulation should be delegated to
specialist regulatory bodies that operate in a transparent way and at arm's length from regulated enterprises
and political authorities. The establishment of such independent regulatory bodies has become a hallmark
of modern infrastructure reforms worldwide. Such bodies should be established as soon as possible before
privatization to provide assurance to investors and consumers, to facilitate the transition from public to
private ownership, and to allow time for training and other forms of regulatory capacity building. In Korea,
regulatory rules are currently administered by line ministries, with pricing decisions also involving the
Ministry of Finance and Economy and sometimes higher-level political authorities. The structure and start-
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up strategy for more independent and specialist regulatory bodies will require early attention in the
proposed reform of the telecommunications, power and gas industries.
2.73 Private Participation in Greenfield Infrastructure Projects. To reduce the burden of
infrastiructure financing on the public sector, and to promote enhanced efficiency in infrastructure
provision, the Government will improve the regulatory and institutional framework for private participation
in greenfield infrastructure projects. The Government has established a team to review Korea's current
policies in this area to bring them into line with international best practices. Some of the key challenges for
the Government will include: ensuring that proposed projects are well-conceived from an economic and
financial standpoint, and form part of broader sector development strategies; ensuring an efficient
allocation of risks between government, operators, and consumers; and ensuring that project procurement
processes are transparent and provide a level playing field between bidders.
D. LABOR MARKET AND SOCIAL SAFETY NETS
2.74 The social sector policy agenda comprises two main elements: improving the functioning of the
labor market to facilitate economic restructuring, as outlined in the preceding sections; and strengthening
the social safety nets, both to mitigate the impact of the current crisis and structural change on the
vulneraLble and to make tangible, lasting improvements in Korea's system of social protection. Important
actions were taken under SAL I in both these respects. Budgetary allocations for social safety net prograrns
were substantially increased (para. 1.13). SAL II will build on this progress, taking into account the need to
strengt]hen the social policy response in view of the sharper downturn in the economy.
Social Protection for Workers
2.75 Labor Market Developments. Unemployment has increased more sharply than expected, rising
from a pre-crisis level of about 3 percent of the workforce to 7.4 percent (or 1.6 million workers) in August
1998. The largest job losses have occurred in construction (465,000) and manufacturing (650,000), with
disproportionately greater losses experienced by female workers. Further increases in the unemployment
rate are: forecast, rising into the 8-10 percent range by the end of 1998 (or at least 1.8 mnillion workers), and
staying high during 1999 before recovering to levels around 5 percent in the years 2000 and 2001. This rise
in open unemployment has been dampened by an increase in disguised unemployment. Some 460,000
people now work less than 18 hours a week, and an additional 180,000 workers are "on leave" without pay,
while still counted as part of their firms' workforce. The measured increase in unemployment has been
further moderated by a reduction of nearly 300,000 in the supply of active job seekers (especially among
women).
2.76 Rigidities in the labor market continue to impede employment creation in the formal sector and
push workers into marginal employment. The industrial relations system that developed during the period
of rapid economic growth has led to high wages and overmanning in certain sectors, while resulting in
oversupply and low wages in the rest of the economy. The large employment losses recorded in some
sectors have been partly offset by increased employment in agriculture by 240,000 and among family
workers (paid and unpaid) by 190,000. Restrictions on the use of dispatched or leased workers in
manufacturing and a number of other occupations are an important impediment o labor market flexibility.
Labor costs of dispatched workers average 40 percent less, and their employment can be adjusted flexibly
according to production needs. Wage differentials among regular employees are also suggestive of the
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segmentation of the Korean labor market. Monthly labor earnings average W1.7 million for large
companies (more than 500 employees) compared to W1.2 million for companies with 10-29 employees and
only W600,000 for companies with fewer than 5 employees.
2.77 Responding to the Rise in Unemployment. The focus of labor market policy should be on
measures that are likely to be sustainable over the medium term in an environment of high unemployment.
Policy design should aim to keep the natural rate of unemployment low by enhancing flexibility in labor
allocation, providing cost-effective means to facilitate re-employment, and offering temporary income
support through unemployment insurance. In line with this approach, some important steps were taken
under SAL I, including legislation enacted in February 1998 that permitted layoffs and expanded
unemployment insurance. SAL II will support significant additional reforms.
2.78 First of all, to support corporate and financial sector restructuring, it is important that the February
legislation legalizing layoffs is fully implemented. The settlement of the Hyundai Motor labor dispute in
August, where in the face of strong resistance from the unionized workforce the new layoff law was not
fully enforced, had a major adverse impact on investor confidence. Similar pressures are likely to arise as
other major corporations and financial institutions, where unionization is high, undertake restructuring. The
Government will need to stand firm. Under SAL II, the Government has renewed its commitment o fully
enforce the layoff provisions of the February legislation. Another legislation passed in February, as part of
SAL I, legalized the operation of manpower leasing services. However, the use of dispatched or leased
manpower in direct production processes in manufacturing was not permitted (except with union
agreement). Later in June, a Presidential Decree was issued which further limited the use of leased workers
to a positive list of 26, mostly white collar occupations. There are also limitations on the term of contract
workers. These restrictions constrain labor market flexibility and should be removed. Besides economic
efficiency, there is an equity argument for removing these labor market rigidities as they protect the
interests of a minority of the workforce that is unionized at the expense of the interests of the vast majority
of workers who are not unionized and who typically earn much less.
2.79 With respect to policies to promote re-employment, care needs to be taken to ensure that expanding
public employment services does not crowd out those provided privately so as to ensure efficient
complementarity between public and private provision of employment services. The rapid expansion
planned in public employment offices, from 53 in 1997 to 162 in 1999, risks undermining the potential
synergy with private employment services that already play an important role in the labor market. In 1997
private employment services placed 1.8 million workers compared to less than 0.3 million by public
employment offices. More than 80 percent of workers assisted by private employment offices are engaged
in elementary and service occupations that usually attract less privileged workers.
2.80 Other active labor market policies comprise the Vocational Ability Development (VAD) and
Employment Security (ES) schemes (such as training and retraining, wage subsidies for reduced hours,
relocation of employment, etc.) provided under the payroll-tax financed Employment Insurance System
(EIS). The experience of other OECD countries suggests that active labor market measures such as
vocational training may not be cost-effective, achieving only limited net effects while imposing high
deadweight losses. Indeed, wage subsidies to non-viable establishments obstruct efficient corporate
restructuring. Unnecessary payroll taxes also have undesirable disincentive effects on firms and workers.
Accordingly, SAL II calls for the cost-effectiveness of the VAD and ES programs to be evaluated and
inefficient programs amended or dropped, while limiting these programs in the interim.
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2.81 Supported by SAL I, the provision of temporary income support for the unemployed was
augmented in mid-1998 by extending the Unemployment Insurance (UI) provisions of EIS to firms
employing more than 5 workers (previously only firms with more than 30 workers were covered). While
this raised coverage to a total of 6.2 million workers, most workers remained uncovered by U1 (fonnal,
insurable labor force is about 13 million). As part of SAL II, legislation has been passed that will further
expand UI coverage to firms with fewer than 5 workers and to temporary and part-time workers with effect
from October 1998. This will raise UI coverage approximately by an additional 2.5 million workers.
Moreover, the Government has implemented enhancements in the benefit structure. The duration of
insurance benefits was increased by two months for all categories of eligibility, with the minimum duration
extended to four months. The minimum replacement rate was raised from 50 to 70 percent of the minimum
wage. To maintain the financial viability of the UI scheme, given these benefit enhancements and the
increased risk of unemployment, the payroll contribution rate has been increased from 0.6 to 1 percent.
However, a further increase in the contribution rate to 2 percent or higher may be necessary to prevent a
depletion of UI reserves in 1999.
Protecting the Poor
2.82 In the past, Korea has successfully relied on rapid growth and near-full employment to provide an
adequate standard of living for the population. In 1996, only 1.5 million people were recipients of the
means-itested Livelihood Protection Program for the poor. Livelihood Protection provides a range of
welfare benefits, including cash income support to the disabled poor and Medical Aid and some other
benefitss (e.g., education) to all beneficiaries. With the sharp drop in employment and incomes, the number
of poor and vulnerable needing public assistance is rising, and new programs have been initiated to expand
coverage and diversify the content of the social safety net. Within the SAL framework, the Government is
committed to allocate sufficient budget to protect expenditures under the existing Livelihood Protection
program in real terms, taking into account the increase in poverty.
2.83 A large increase in poverty incidence is likely to occur during 1998, and continue in 1999. At least
one-third of the unemployed, or some 600,000 workers, are expected to have incomes less than the poverty
line. Including family members, this imnplies that an additional 2.4 million people could become poor. This
effect could be magnified if the role of private transfers in providing an informal safety net, especially for
the elderly, contracts substantially in the wake of the crisis. Such developments highlight the need for
increased budgetary expenditure on safety net programs to prevent the rising numbers of the unemployed
and their dependent family members from falling into poverty. These programs need to be designed to
maximize their effectiveness in poverty reduction, but also to minimize the potential for creating work
disincentives. Thus it will be important to strengthen the database for monitoring trends in the number of
crisis-induced vulnerable households, and for assessing the effectiveness of programs to reach those in
need.
2.84 In May 1998, supported by SAL I, the Government implemented a new workfare program targeted
at the unemployed. Phase I of the program provided temporary employment for some 75,000 workers, out
of around 130,000 applicants. Phase II of the program began in August 1998 and is expected to absorb up
to 150,000 workers, out of at least 200,000 applicants. Given the excess supply of labor already
forthcorming at the public works wage rates, SAL II supports a further expansion of this program. There is
likely to be a substantial increase in demand for temporary workfare as unemployment continues to rise,
with unemployment insurance either not available or not yet effective for some and lapsing for others. The
excess supply of labor also signals the importance of keeping wage rates low in order to maximize self-
targeting to poor applicants. The public works wage rate is lower than the prevailing market wage for
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comparable activities, but is higher than the minimum wage. The Government will need to resist pressures
to allow wages to drift upwards.
2.85 The Government also introduced a new noncontributory means-tested unemployment allowance in
April 1998 targeted at the uninsured unemployed with incomes and assets below a defined threshold, an
initiative supported by SAL I. The current budget provides for 310,000 applicants for this allowance. This
figure is well below the size of the eligible target population, which is increasing and is likely to number at
least 600,000. Accordingly, SAL II supports an expansion of this program. Also, it calls for the amount of
assistance per family to be set at a level that avoids adverse work incentives and facilitates self-selection.
Financial Risk Management for Health
2.86 Health-related financial risks are an important factor affecting household welfare. The affordability
of major financial risks is deteriorating in the face of adverse income shocks. Currency depreciation has
raised the price of pharmaceuticals with significant import content. These shocks call for improved
management of health-related financial risks, especially in protecting the poor from suffering financial
catastrophe in obtaining medical care. The main policy instruments for managing health-related financial
risks in Korea are the Medical Insurance System (MIS) funded by mandatory social insurance
contributions, and the budget-financed Medical Aid Program (MAP) for poor beneficiaries of the means-
tested Livelihood Protection program. Since 1989, these risk management arrangements have achieved
near-universal coverage in terms of enrollment: roughly 95 percent of the population is enrolled in MIS
and the remaining 5 percent in MAP. But universal enrollment does not entail comprehensive coverage of
financial risks. Instead, the Korean health insurance system is noted for its high coinsurance rates, which
can impose a heavy burden of out-of-pocket costs on patients, especially the poor. The introduction of more
efficient and equitable risk management mechanisms, as envisaged in SAL II and outlined below, is an
important objective of social policy during adjustment.
2.87 Reforms to MIS to achieve better risk management span two issues. First, the fragmented
organization of some 370 small health insurance funds results in a high average administrative cost ratio of
8.5 percent, ranging up to 16 percent. These leakages to administrative costs reduce the funds available for
pooling financial risks among members. The Government is evaluating options for organizational
consolidation that would enhance risk-pooling capacity. Second, measures are being considered to close the
gap between nominal and effective coinsurance rates, especially for low-probability but high-cost inpatient
care. The nominal coinsurance structure efficiently assigns differential coinsurance rates between low-cost
outpatient and high-cost inpatient care. A hospital outpatient visit requires a deductible plus 55 percent
coinsurance while an inpatient stay requires a 20 percent coinsurance. In reality, however, estimates
indicate that the effective coinsurance rate for hospital inpatient services is much higher, averaging more
than 40 percent and ranging up to 70 percent for services such as obstetrics and gynecology. This
divergence results from the exclusion of Special Treatment Charges (STCs) for covered services, as well as
certain non-covered services, from the regulated fee-for-service reimbursement structure. As a result,
Korea's private financing ratio is one of the highest in the world at 69 percent of aggregate health
expenditure, considerably greater than the averages for East Asia (49 percent) and OECD (26 percent).
2.88 The MAP faces similar reform issues in reducing effective coinsurance rates for poor beneficiaries
of Livelihood Protection. Only the minority of beneficiaries confined to home or institutions are covered by
Class I Medical Aid, which finances 100 percent of regulated patient charges, but does not pay for
additional STCs and non-covered services. The majority are enrolled in Class II Medical Aid, which
requires a 50 percent coinsurance, plus extra STCs and non-covered charges. Beneficiaries of both classes
-28 -
Republic of Korea - Second Structural Adjustment Loan
suffer the additional disadvantage of discrimination by providers resulting from the lack of harmonization
of government-regulated fee-for-service provider reimbursement levels, which are lower for MAP than
MIS.
Pensiion System Reform
2.89 The reform of Korea's pension system is motivated by several objectives: the social goal of
securing adequate income support for the elderly, especially the elderly poor in the present crisis; the fiscal
need ito ensure the financial viability of the pension schemes; and the broader economic objectives of
developing the capital market (and thereby help reduce the heavy reliance on bank debt and facilitate
corporate restructuring) and supporting an efficient labor market.
2.90 Since the National Pension Scheme (NPS), which covers most private sector workers, was
introduced only in 1988 and has not yet matured, the present generation of elderly Koreans must depend on
their own earnings, savings and family support for their livelihood. For many, this will be insufficient o
prevent poverty, and social assistance is therefore required. Under SAL I, a means-tested non-contributory
"social pension" for the needy elderly was introduced. To ensure the adequacy of this scheme, SAL II will
suppoirt an expansion of its coverage and benefits. In order to effectively target limited resources, the
impacit of the scheme will be carefully monitored.
2.91 In the short run, fiscal pressures from pension outlays will come from the special occupational
schemes which have now matured and will soon begin to run deficits. The civil servants scheme in
particular will face financial difficulties soon. The fact that the finances of these schemes are not clearly
reported in the fiscal accounts, and the dearth of actuarial projections, mask a growing fiscal threat. As a
first step in the process of reforming occupational pensions, SAL II will support improvements in the
accounting and actuarial assessment of these schemes.
2.92 The financial position of the NPS is much more favorable in the short term as it continues to run
significant surpluses. However, in the longer run, the current relationship of contributions to benefits is
likely to lead to large deficits. Motivated by SAL I, important legislation reducing benefits and increasing
contributions has been prepared. These changes, however, will not completely eliminate deficits and
establish actuarial balance in the long run, implying the need for further reform. Deficits in NPS would
occur sooner if its reserves (now at more than seven percent of GDP) are not efficiently invested. Within
the SAL framework, the Bank is supporting improvements in the transparency and efficiency of NPS fund
management. The measures include phasing out forced lending to government from the pension fund
reserves, applying economic criteria to investments, and introducing more professional asset management.
These ireforms would both help NPS financial performance and contribute to capital market development.
2.93 The NPS is likely to be the most important component of Korea's system of old age income
security in the next century and reform efforts have naturally focused on it. Nevertheless, the special
occupational pension schemes, mandatory retirement allowances, and tax-favored individual retirement
savings are also important components of the overall system. Millions of workers have acquired rights to
retirement allowance payments whose magnitude is large and which will need to be handled in the difficult
setting of widespread corporate distress. An appropriate framework for voluntary private pensions needs to
be put in place, and tax and regulatory issues relating to pensions need to be addressed. Future reform of
the pension system needs to give private management and funded pensions a larger role in the system,
strengthening links to the capital market. These elements must be integrated into an overall, coherent
reform package aimed at developing an efficient, equitable and financially sustainable pension system. As
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envisaged in SAL I, and supported by SAL II, a Task Force is being established to prepare a White Paper
on options for an integrated pension reform for public debate.
Im BANK GROUP STRATEGY
A. THE BANK
3.1 The structural reform program described in the preceding section is grounded in a medium-term
framework. The Bank is supporting this medium-term reform effort through a series of structural
adjustment loans linked to-progress on the reforms. As part of the $57 billion international support package
for Korea from multilateral and bilateral.sources agreed in December 1997, the Bank undertook to provide
up to $10 billion in assistance. The proposed SAL II in an amount of $2 billion is the third Bank loan to be
provided within this framework, following a $3 billion Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL) disbursed in
December 1997 and a $2 billion Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL I) disbursed in March 1998.
3.2 Strategic Priorities and Lending Program. The Bank program is designed to support Korea's
strategic priorities in the wake of the crisis: restoring macrofinancial stability while minimizing the costs to
the real economy and the impact on the vulnerable; and addressing the underlying causes of the crisis
through a program of structural reforms that would lay the basis for Korea's return to high and sustainable
growth. Accordingly, the lending program includes a series of fast-disbursing loans that both provide quick
financing and support the needed structural reforms while cushioning the impact on the poor and the
vulnerable.
3.3 The Government recognizes that a major restructuring of the incentives and institutional
framework is needed to deal with the problems in the financial and corporate sectors and to sustain strong
and stable growth in today's more integrated and competitive global economy. Also, the system of social
protection needs to be strengthened to limit the social costs of adjustment. Building on SAL I, the proposed
SAL II supports reforms in three areas central to this effort: (i) financial sector restructuring and
development, including capital market development; (ii) corporate sector reform, including corporate debt
restructuring, reform of corporate governance and competition policies, and reform and privatization of
state-owned corporations, especially in infrastructure sectors; and (iii) labor market reform and
strengthening of social safety nets. Future lending operations would continue to support a deepening and
extension of reforms in these key areas. In addition to follow-up structural adjustment lending, the use of
SECALs or guarantee operations is a possibility.
3.4 Technical Assistance and Non-Lending Services. To assist in the design and implementation of
reforms supported by the adjustment operations, many of which require specialist expertise, the Bank has
initiated a major program of technical assistance. Technical assistance is being provided through several
means: in the process of preparation and supervision of the adjustment operations themselves; through a
$48 million technical assistance loan for financial and corporate sector restructuring (FCRAL) approved in
August 1998; through technical assistance supported by grant funds, recently augmented by the ASEM
program; through economic and sector work on selected topics designed to strengthen the analytical
underpinnings of the lending operations; and through ongoing policy dialogue. Both EDI and DEC are
being actively involved in the TA/training and dissemination activities. Active collaboration has also been
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developed with Korea's well-regarded think tanks. Several important seminars have been organized in
Seoul, on major issues of reform and on lessons learned from the Korean crisis and their relevance to other
countries. A major international conference on Democracy, Market Economy and Development has been
arranged for February 1999, to be inaugurated jointly by President Kim Dae-Jung and Mr. Wolfensohni.
3.5 Special Emphasis on Social Programs. An important element of the Bank's program of support
will be the strengthening of Korea's system of social protection. Of immediate priority are measures that
would cushion the short-term impact of the crisis and structural adjustment on the poor and the
vulnerable-protection of pro-poor expenditures in the budget and measures to assist unemployed workers.
But thie Bank is also supporting a longer-term agenda of actions that would produce lasting improvements
in Korea's system of social protection. These include the strengthening of the information base for poverty
monitoring and targeting; improvement of the unemployment insurance system and related labor market
information; and reform of the pension system, including related reform of health insurance. This agenda
would be supported both within the framework of the SALs and through technical assistance and other non-
lending services. Support to the social sector agenda would be a major focus of the ASEM program, and a
range of proposals for analytical work and technical assistance have been developed for funding under that
program.
3.6 Implementation. Delivering a high-quality, high-speed program of this magnitude requires a
substantial commitment of staff and budgetary resources. The Bank has moved swiftly to respond to the
client's needs in a crisis situation. The first $3 billion loan was disbursed within three weeks of the client's
request. The subsequent SALs have also been prepared on a fast track. The monitoring of macroeconomic
and financial developments has been strengthened. A new Korea country unit was created in January 1998.
It is located in the field to maximize client responsiveness and achievement of results on the ground. While
the core country team remains small, best available expertise is being tapped from all over the institution to
staff strong task teams, supplemented by outside expertise. The financial sector work is being conducted by
a team from the new Special Financial Operations Unit, within the framework of the country assistance
strategy.
3.7 The country assistance program will be fleshed out further through discussions with the
Government which are continuing. A short and focused country assistance strategy (CAS) is being
prepared, which will set out the planned lending and non-lending activities and their sequencing within an
overalil country strategic framework.
3.8 Of the loans made by the Bank to Korea prior to its graduation from Bank borrowing in FY95,
involviing a total commitmnent of about $8.7 billion, nine remain active, with an undisbursed balance of
about $225 million. Their implementation status is rated as either "satisfactory" or "highly satisfactory."
Prior to the ERL, outstanding loans to Korea amounted to $1.9 billion. Outstanding loans now amount to
$6.9 billion. The status of Bank Group operations in Korea is detailed in Annex 3.
B. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (IFC)
3.9 Prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis, IFC had not been active in Korea for the preceding
ten years, its last investment having been made in 1988. The crisis has resulted in a strong potential role for
IFC and the Corporation is now re-engaging actively in Korea. IFC aims to follow a flexible approach in
Korea, responding- to the changing needs of the market as well as individual institutions, delivering
technical assistance, new products or investments as needed at various stages of the country's recovery. In
the immediate future, a major element of IFC's strategy is to assist in the restructuring of Korean
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corporates and financial institutions which will directly aid the recovery of these institutions as well as the
economy.
3.10 In FY98, IFC provided about $245 million through four transactions in the financial sector. Since
the banking system accounts for a significant part of the Korean financial system and its recovery is
important for public confidence, IFC has provided about $175 million in financing to strengthen two
existing client banks and arranged a $100 million trade financing facility as well. To support corporate
restructuring and long-term venture investments, IFC is mobilizing foreign equity capital through a $100
million private equity fund. IFC is also undertaking strategic investments in companies with strong
fundamental business prospects and is currently processing about ten projects in the general manufacturing,
agribusiness and petrochemicals ectors, and expects to provide about $250 million in financing for these
projects. Given the current high level of demand for IFC financing and range of opportunities, IFC has
reassigned several staff to working on Korea and is co-locating a small contingent of IFC staff in the World
Bank's new Resident Office in Seoul.
3.11 Since its first investment in 1968, IFC has made gross commitmnents totaling about $455 million of
which about $125 million is currently outstanding.
C. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (MIGA)
3.12 Korea joined MIGA in April 1988. So far, MIGA has not issued any guarantees in Korea. MIGA
has received one Definitive Application for a financial sector project and five Preliminary Applications for
projects in financial services, power and the manufacturing sector. Korea has benefited from MIGA's
technical assistance and promotional services. Over 80 Korean organizations are users of MIGA's Internet-
based market place, IPAnet, which promotes investment in emerging markets by serving as an on-line
information exchange among public and private organizations. MIGA is strengthening its relationship with
the Korean Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). It will continue to offer its full range of
services to Korea, in investment promotion and in capacity-building for public and private organizations
involved in investment promotion, for which there is likely to be increased demand in the wake of the crisis.
D. COORDINATION WITH IMF AND ADB
3.13 The Bank has been working closely with the IMF since the onset of the crisis, in monitoring
macroeconomic and financial developments, advising the Government on the response to the crisis, and
coordinating our support. The preparation of SALs has been coordinated closely with the Fund stand-by
arrangement to ensure consistency and complementarity, with active collaboration between the two staffs
both at headquarters and in the field through parallel missions. Implementation under the 3-year, SDR 15.5
billion stand-by arrangement is on track. Given its mandate, the Fund has taken the lead in the dialogue on
macroeconomic stabilization measures. The Fund has also spearheaded the dialogue on trade policy and
capital account liberalization. In the financial sector, both the Bank and the Fund have been actively
involved, with the division of labor guided by their respective mandates and comparative advantage. The
Bank has taken the lead in other areas of structural reform, including corporate sector reform (corporate
restructuring, corporate governance, competition policies, privatization), and labor market reform and
social protection.
3.14 As part of the $57 billion international financing package for Korea from multilateral and bilateral
sources, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) undertook to provide up to $4 billion in adjustment financing
and $15 million in technical assistance in support of financial sector restructuring and development. Of the
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$4 billion committed, $3 billion has so far been disbursed. As with the IMF, the World Bank is
coordinating closely with the ADB in its financial sector work.
IV. TEIE LOAN
4.1 The proposed loan is consistent with the Bank's country assistance strategy outlined above. The
Government has prepared and subrnitted a Letter of Development Policy requesting Bank support for a
strong structural adjustment program aimed at achieving durable financial stability and laying the basis for
resumption of strong, sustainable growth. The reform program, prepared in close cooperation with the
Bank, is described in detail in the Policy Matrix attached to the Letter of Development Policy (Annex 1).
A. BOARD PRESENTATION AND TRANCHE RELEASE CONDITIONS
4.2 The full programn of policy actions to be supported by SAL II is set out in the SAL II Policy
Matrix (Annex 1). Within this full program, a subset of key policy actions has been identified as conditions
for Board presentation and second tranche release. Besides the implementation of these specific policy
actions, a general condition will be that the implementation of the full program is satisfactory overall.
4.3 Conditions for Board Presentation. Within the full program detailed in the Policy Matrix, the
following were identified as conditions for Board presentation, all of which have now been met:
1. Adoption of objectives and principles acceptable to the Bank to be used by the Government in making
decisions on the implementation plans of the seven undercapitalized banks, and other banks so
identified, including the provision of financial support by the Government.
2. AgJreement between the Government and the lead manager selected for the privatization of Korea First
Banmk and Seoul Bank on the general deal structure (including confirmation to the Bank of the
moclalities of provision of public support), and authorization to the lead manager to contact investors.
3. Adoption of principles acceptable to the Bank governing the use of public resources in financial system
restructuring and recapitalization.
4. Iss,uance of guidelines to financial institutions by FSC, satisfactory to the Bank, limiting the extension
of "emergency" loans to corporations.
5. Commitment to establish an independent accounting standard setting organization by June 1999.
6. Adoption and announcement of an overall strategy acceptable to the Bank for dealing with structural,
regulatory and institutional issues in privatization and SOE reform in infrastructure sectors, includling,
inter alia, the priority to be given to transition toward more competitive market structures and
establishment of appropriate regulatory structures, and sequencing of structural, regulatory and
ownership reforms.
7. Extension of unemployment insurance to firms with fewer than five workers and to temporary and part-
tiniie workers, with effect from October 1998.
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8. Adoption and announcement of a timetable agreed with the Bank for the reduction of forced
government appropriation of the flow of National Pension Fund surpluses, and announcement of the
Government's commnitment that the stock of its outstanding borrowings from NPF will be repaid in full
at maturity without rollovers.
4.4 Conditions for Second Tranche Release. Within the full program detailed in the Policy Matrix,
the following will serve as conditions for release of the second tranche, in addition to the general
requirement of overall satisfactory progress in carrying out the full program.
1. Maintenance of a sound macroeconomic framework, consistent with the objectives of the Program, as
determined on the basis of indicators agreed to by the Government and the Bank.
2. In consultation with the Bank, adoption of process and principles necessary to ensure that adequate
public resources will be made available by the Government for use in financial system recapitalization
and restructuring.
3. Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, toward sale by the Government of majority
ownership in Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank through a biding process satisfactory to the Bank.
4. (a) Adoption by KAMCO of principles, acceptable to the Bank, for the disposition of troubled assets
acquired by KAMCO, including the sale of a majority of assets within three years of acquisition. (b)
Adoption of procedures, sources and instruments of funding for KAMCO acceptable to the Bank.
5. (a) Adoption and issuance by FSC of improved accounting and auditing standards for financial
institutions, listed companies and joint stock companies consistent with international best practice and
prepared with participation of representatives of internationally recognized accounting firms, and
institution and announcement of the requirement hat financial statements of financial institutions, listed
companies, and joint stock companies with assets in excess of W7 billion will be prepared and audited
in accordance with these standards from fiscal year 1999. (b) Adoption and announcement of an
implementation plan acceptable to the Bank for the establishment of an independent accounting
standard setting organization by June 1999.
6. Adoption and announcement of a plan and schedule acceptable to the Bank for the institution of a
requirement for the establishment by listed companies of audit committees of boards of directors, and
completion of a draft of necessary changes in laws and regulations to give effect to this requirement.
7. Enactment of amendments to the Fair Trade Act, acceptable to the Bank, to enhance competition in the
domestic economy, based on the recommendations of the Joint Public/Private Sector Committee.
8. Enactment of the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels.
9. Enactment of legislation, satisfactory to the Bank, modifying restrictions under the Fair Trade Act on
the creation of holding company structures so as to permit such structures subject to conditions to
avoid undue ownership concentration.
10. Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, on enhancement of labor market flexibility.
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11. Allocation of amounts in the 1999 budget sufficient o: (a) expand the public works progran to absorb
the supply of labor forthcoming at targeted wage levels (not higher in real terms than under Phase II of
this program); (b) expand the provision of means-tested non-contributory income support for the
unemployed poor in line with the increase in the eligible target population; (c) expand workfare and
other forms of income support for able-bodied beneficiaries of "self-support" under the livelihood
protection program; and (d) at least maintain in real terms the level of expenditure per beneficiary
under the existing livelihood protection programs for the poor.
12. Implementation of the phased reduction of forced government appropriations from the National Pension
Fund agreed with the Bank, through adoption of legislation satisfactory to the Bank, including
necessary revisions to the Public Fund Management Act.
B. LOAN ADMINISTRATION
4.5 Terms and Conditions. At the request of the Government, the proposed loan would be a Single
Currency Loan in US Dollars, with a fifteen-year maturity including a five-year grace period. The loan
amount proposed is US$2 billion, to be disbursed in two equal tranches. The interest rate on the loan would
be six-month US Dollar LIBOR, reset semiannually, plus 75 basis points. A service charge of 1.5 percent
of the loan amount would be payable on effectiveness, financed out of the proceeds of the first tranche and
amortized over the life of the loan. Standard terms would apply to commitment fee and prepayment. The
Borrowver would be ineligible for current or future waivers of interest or commitment charges.
4.6 Disbursement. The Government will open and maintain a deposit account with the Bank of Korea
(BOK). Upon effectiveness, and upon satisfaction of second tranche release conditions, the Government
will submit a simplified withdrawal application to the Bank, against which the Bank will disburse tranche
proceeds into the Deposit Account. Disbursements will not be linked to specific purchases, and supporting
evidence for disbursements is therefore not required. The proceeds of the loan will not be used to finance
expenditures typically excluded under the Loan Agreement (local expenditures, military, drugs, nuclear,
etc.).
4.7 Accounts and Audit. Upon the Bank's request, the Government will have the Deposit Account
audited by independent auditors acceptable to the Bank and will furnish to the Bank a certified copy of the
audit report no later than four months after the Bank's request.
C. BENEFITS AND RISKS
4.8 Benefits. Besides helping Korea effectively overcome its external financial crisis and restore
investor confidence, the proposed loan will support a major program of structural reforms in the financial
and real sectors, building on SAL I and maintaining the momentum of reform. The program involves a
deepening of reforms in three key areas: financial sector restructuring and development, including capital
market development; corporate sector reform, including corporate debt restructuring, reform of corporate
governance and competition policies, and privatization; and labor market reform and the strengthening of
social safety nets. Together, these reforms imply a radical restructuring of the incentives and institutional
framework influencing the behavior of all major actors in the economy-financial institutions, businesses,
labor, policy makers-a restructuring that would foster financial soundness, increase corporations'
exposure to market discipline, enhance competition (domestic and foreign), and open up the labor market to
increased flexibility. This shift is necessary to underpin financial sector stability, promote increased real
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sector efficiency and competitiveness, and lay the basis for Korea's return to a path of strong and sustained
growth in the context of today's more integrated and competitive global economy.
4.9 The proposed loan will strengthen social programs to cushion the impact of the crisis and
structural adjustment on the vulnerable. Besides the provision of support to the poor to tide over a difficult
period, the reform prograrn will make lasting improvements in the social safety net-unemployment
insurance system, targeting of poverty programs-and initiate a reform of the country's pension system and
health insurance.
4.10 In sum, the proposed SAL II, which forms part of an internationally coordinated support package
for Korea, will both help Korea consolidate its -recovery from the financial crisis and assist in the necessary
post-crisis remodeling of its economy. The region, and the international financial system at large, will also
benefit from a quick restoration of market confidence and recovery of growth in Korea.
4.11 Risks. Korea has made significant progress in restoring stability to the foreign exchange market
and strengthening its external financial position. However, investor confidence remains fragile and the
external position still is vulnerable to major shocks. There are risks in the external environment, especially
those relating to the regional situation, e.g., developments in Japan. Mitigating these risks is the firmness
the Government has demonstrated in implementing tough macroeconomic policies in response to the crisis,
which inspires confidence in the Government's macroeconomic risis response ability. The rebuilding of
international reserves since the crisis also provides a cushion against shocks, as does the restructuring of
foreign liabilities toward longer maturities. The provision of additional adjustmnent financing by the Bank
through the proposed loan, and the structural reforms conducive to restoration of Korea's competitiveness
and foothold in export markets that the loan would support, would provide further comfort to markets.
4.12 The fragility of the banking system and high corporate leverage are major sources of vulnerability
in the Korean economy. Accordingly, addressing these vulnerabilities through financial and corporate
sector restructuring forns the core of the program supported by the proposed loan. The required
restructuring, however, will be a difficult process and risks of slippage cannot be ignored. The risks arise
from several factors: pressures from vested interests that militate against deep restructuring and could lead
instead to a "muddle-through" approach; inefficient, non-transparent use of public resources that
accentuates moral hazard and results in large fiscal costs without achieving meaningful, durable
restructuring; weak financial system and corporate governance; or inadequate implementation capacities.
The proposed program mitigates these risks by putting in place a clear, monitorable framework for
financial and corporate sector restructuring, building in appropriate incentives and safeguards; by setting
out clear criteria for public resource use; by supporting complementary actions to improve financial system
and corporate governance; and by providing technical assistance to both regulatory and supervisory
authorities and to units in banks specially set up to negotiate corporate debt workouts (supported by the
FCRAL).
4.13 There is also a general risk that political factors may cause the reform effort to slow. There can be
several sources for such risks: shifts in the balance of power between the ruling and opposition parties;
severity of the economic downturn causing political support for reform to unravel; increasing labor union
militancy as unemployment rises; and a premature sense of complacency as the external financial situation
improves. The strong commitment o reform demonstrated by the Government so far, reflected in the
implementation of some major and politically difficult reforms, provides assurance against these risks.
True, union militancy has increased, but union actions so far have failed to attract wider public support,
and the Government has committed to stand firm in defense of its pro-reform agenda. The Government,
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supported by the Bank program, is taking strong measures to strengthen the social safety net, and has
followed a participatory approach in designing important policy responses through a tripartite forum
bringing together govenmment, business and labor representatives, measures that contribute to preserving
the social consensus for reform.
D. IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING
4.14 Korea has a strong track record in the implementation of its undertakings with the Bank.
Implementation of the ongoing portfolio of nine investment projects is consistently rated as either
satisfactory or highly satisfactory. Commitment to implementation is also reflected in the progress made so
far under the recent adjustment loans. The proposed SAL II which supports a major reform agenda
contains strong prior actions in all the key areas of reform. The two-tranche design of SAL II will also help
with implementation and monitoring. Implementation will be monitored through regular reviews.
Additionally, dialogue on follow-up Bank operations would provide the occasion to assess implementation
and outcomes.
4.15 Implementation will be supported by provision of technical assistance in the design and execution
of envisaged reform, most importantly through the recently approved FCRAL which focuses on the
difficult areas of financial and corporate sector restructuring. As in the case of recent adjustment loans, the
Letter of Development Policy includes clear undertakings by the Government o provide the Bank relevant
and timely information on all areas covered by the program to facilitate monitoring of progress. The
location of the Bank's Korea country unit in the field also facilitates effective monitoring.
V. RECOMMENDATION
5.1 I am satisfied that the proposed loan complies with the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and I
recommend that the Executive Directors approve it.
James D. Wolfensohn
President
by Sven Sandstrom
Washington, D.C.
October 2, 1998
Annexes
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SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
ANNEXI
LETTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Seoul, Korea
September 24, 1998
Mr. James D. Wolfensohn
President
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Washington, D.C., 20433
Dear Mr. President:
SUBJECT: PROPOSED SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
Letter of Development Policy
1. In response to the economic crisis, the Korean Govenmment embarked on a major structural
reform program last December. Since then, we have made substantial progress in the
implementation of this reform program, despite a difficult macroeconomic setting and associated
social and political pressures. Our commitment o structural reform reflects our conviction that the
response to the crisis must not just deal with its immediate symptoms but address its root causes.
We fully recognize that fundamental reforms are needed in the incentives and institutional
framework to restore Korea's economic performance in today's more integrated and competitive
global economy.
2. Our economic reform program has two main objectives: restoring macrofinancial stability
while limiting the costs to the real economy and the impact on the vulnerable; and strengthening the
economy's structural foundation to lay the basis for resumption of strong and sustainable growth.
We have made considerable progress in restoring stability in the foreign exchange market and
rebuilding external reserves. However, the impact of the crisis on the domestic economy has been
severe. We have responded to this situation by adjusting our macroeconomic policies to mitigate
the: severity of the recession and support an early recovery of domestic demand, consistent with
sustaining the hard-won gains in restoring external financial stability. We will continue to work
closely with the IMF in ensuring that our macroeconomic policy framework remains sound and
responsive to the economic situation. In the area of structural reform, where we are working
closely with the World Bank, we have intensified our efforts in all keys areas of reform, including
the, reform of the financial system, restructuring of the corporate sector, and strengthening of social
safety nets.
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3. In the design and implementation of our structural reform program, we have received
important support from the World Bank, first through an Economic Reconstruction Loan (ERL)
and then a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL). In recent weeks, we have held intensive discussions
with the World Bank, and have reached a common understanding on the next stage of reforms.
Details of policy actions that we will take under the reform program agreed with the Bank are
provided in the attached Policy Matrix. As you will see, these actions constitute a strong and
comprehensive reform program. We seek World Bank support for this program through a Second
Structural Adjustment Loan.
4. Building on the progress made under the previous loans, the program described in the
Policy Matrix aims to achieve a major deepening of reforms in three key policy areas: financial
sector reform; corporate sector restructuring; and labor market reform and strengthening of social
safety nets. In all of these areas, the program includes substantial up-front actions. While the
details are provided in the Policy Matrix, allow me to highlight some important elements of the
reform program.
5. In the financial sector, we are giving priority to the resolution of troubled financial
institutions, but are also taking steps to improve the regulatory and institutional framework to
support sound development of the financial system in the future. The program includes the
following main elements: resolution of weak financial institutions, especially banks, based on a
timetable and decision criteria on resolution options agreed with the Bank, and supported by
diagnostic reviews and assessment of bank rehabilitation and implementation plans; adoption and
application of principles and processes, agreed with the Bank, for the use of public resources in
financial sector restructuring and recapitalization and for the management of the acquired assets;
enhancement of the independence, authority and institutional capacity of the agency charged with
consolidated supervision of the financial sector-FSC; strengthening of prudential regulations,
especially those relating to large exposures and connected lending; and development of the capital
market through encouragement of new institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds) and asset
securitization, standardization of government bond issues, and strengthening of securities market
prudential rules and self-regulated organizations.
6. In the corporate sector, we have established, in consultation with the Bank, a framework
for corporate debt workouts led by creditor banks under guidelines established by the FSC and
linked to financial sector restructuring. The workout process will be supported by policies to limit
ccemergency" loans; reduce cross-guaranties; facilitate debt-equity swaps, asset sales, and mergers
and acquisitions; remove tax disincentives; and further improve insolvency laws and procedures.
We will ensure that corporate debt restructuring takes place in a market-based manner, through
voluntary workouts between corporations and their creditors subject to the rules and guidelines that
have been established by the FSC and are described in the Policy Matrix. We will promote
corporate restructuring vehicles that are privately financed and managed. We will avoid direct
government interventions in the corporate restructuring process that can be distortive and that
entail moral hazard. The Government has announced on September 8, 1998 that it will not
entertain any demands from the chaebol for special financial or fiscal privileges, such as from the
top five chaebol in support of the recently announced mergers of some of their industrial units
known as "big-deals," that depart from the discipline and transparency of the framework for
corporate restructuring agreed with the Bank and described in the Policy Matrix.
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7. To restore, and sustain, financial viability and competitiveness, Korean firms need both
financial and real restructuring. The latter requires improvements in the governance of firms and
increased exposure to competitive pressures. Our program for improvements in corporate
governance includes strengthening of the responsibilities, independence and accountability of
corporate boards; enhancement of minority shareholder and institutional investor rights; and
improvement of the legal framework for creditors' rights. Financial transparency and
accountability will be enhanced by the adoption of accounting, auditing and reporting standards for
financial institutions and corporations that are consistent with international best practice,
strengthening of the internal audit function and the financial oversight role of boards of directors,
and enhancement of the role of independent professional bodies in standard-setting and oversight in
accounting and auditing. Policies to enhance competition will include strengthening the Fair Trade
Act and its enforcement; tightening the regulation of cartels and preventing collusion; ensuring a
competitive framework for chaebol restructuring; further liberalizing foreign investment; and
simplifying import certification procedures. The establishment of holding companies will be
allowed in order to provide a more transparent ownership framework for corporate groups.
8. Building on the understandings reached under SAL I, the Government has initiated a major
program of reform and privatization of state-owned corporations. The program includes opening
the major infrastructure sectors to private participation. In this regard, an important focus of our
polticy will be the timely implementation of regulatory and institutional reforms in the infrastructure
sectors to be privatized in order to ensure that the planned privatization takes place in a transparent
and competitive framework and yields maximum efficiency benefits.
9. In the area of labor market and social safety nets, our program comprises two main
elements: improving the functioning of the labor market to facilitate economic restructuring; and
strengthening the social safety net, both to mitigate the social costs of the current crisis and
structural change and to make tangible, lasting improvements in Korea's system of social
protection. We will fully implement he reform enacted in February this year legalizing layoffs, and
will further enhance labor market flexibility by actions to reduce remaining market rigidities. Our
labor market agenda also includes strengthening employment services and amending active labor
market programs based on a critical review of their cost-effectiveness.
10. With the support of the World Bank, we have substantially strengthened our social safety
nelt programs. With effect from October 1998, unemployment insurance will be extended to firms
employing fewer than five workers and to temporary and part-time workers. Contribution rates will
be adjusted to maintain the financial viability of the insurance scheme. For those not covered by
unemployment insurance, we will expand the public works program and the means-tested non-
contributory income support program for the unemployed poor. We are committed to expand in
real terms budget allocations for poverty-targeted programs, such as the livelihood protection
program, proportionately with any increase in the prevalence of poverty as a result of the crisis.
We are also initiating a reform of our health insurance, to increase the protection of poor
beneficiaries, improve the coverage of major financial risks, and raise administrative efficiency.
Our continuing efforts in pension system reform focus on ensuring the adequacy of "social
pension" for the elderly poor, and improving the transparency and efficiency of pension fund
management and strengthening links to capital market development.
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11. The Government will work closely with the Bank in implementing the reform program
described above. To facilitate monitoring of progress on the reforms, we will provide the Bank
relevant and timely information on the implementation of policies in all areas covered by the
structural reform program and detailed in the Policy Matrix. On progress with corporate debt
restructuring within the framework set out in the Policy Matrix, we will provide regular
information in accordance with frequency and format agreed with the Bank. We will continue to
provide periodic information on key indicators for the financial sector as agreed under the ERL.
Also, we will provide information on selected indicators to help monitor the effects of policy
reforms as agreed under the SAL, and on any additional such indicators proposed by the Bank.
12. We reaffirm our commitments made under the ERL and the SAL to halt directed lending
and policy loans. We also reaffirm our commitments made under these loans with respect to the
transparency of fiscal accounting.
13. In order to promote public awareness of our reform program, we will make full disclosure
to the public of the program agreed with the World Bank, including making public the full text of
this letter and its attached Policy Matrix and annexes.
14. In conclusion, Korea, under the leadership of President Kim Dae-Jung, remains fully
committed to its reform program aimed at bringing about a major restructuring of its economy in
order to restore strong and sustainable growth. The World Bank's continuing support to our
program would be of invaluable help in enabling Korea meet the challenges of restructuring and
achieve its growth and development objectives.
Signed
Kyu-Sung Lee
Minister of Finance and Economy
Attachment: Policy Matrix
KOREA: SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
POLICY MA-tARiX
Macroeconomic Framework
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Restoration of financial stability and Sound management of macroeconomic policies-fiscal, Continued adherence to a sound macroeconomic
resumption of sustainable growth. monetary, exchange rate, and external debt and reserve framework.
management policies-conducive to financial stability
and an early recovery of economic activity.
I.-
KOREA: SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
POLICY MATRIX
Financial Sector Reform
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Resolution of Weak Financial
Institutions
Develop financial sector Further develop and clarify strategy, in consultation with the Continue to develop strategy (supported by TA). Issue written
restructuring strategy Bank, including ensuring adequacy of public resources for policies and guidelines consistent with that strategy (ongoing).
use in recapitalizing and restructuring the financial system. In consultation with the Bank, adopt process and principles
necessary to ensure adequate public resources will be made
available by Government in financial system recapitalization
and restructuring.
Resolve 5 undercapitalized FSC to agree specific contract terms with acquiring banks Monitor implementation of contracts and
commercial banks and communicate complete contract terms to Bank (August performance (ongoing).
31). Terms shall include: i) firm agreement on definition
of amount and approach to non-performing assets subject to
put-back taking into consideration non only past due status,
but also qualitative factors affecting loss potential; ii)
provision of enough time for acquiring banks to evaluate
quality of acquired assets; iii) finality of contractual terms
precluding subsequent renegotiation by acquiring banks.
Resolve 7 undercapitalized Banks to submit implementation plans by July 31. Announcement by FSC of its decision on implementation
commercial banks FSC to distribute a template for review of implementation plans by September 30 (decision processes supported by
plans of the four largest conditionally approved banks to aid domestic and international experts, chosen in consultation
in evaluating the feasibility of banks' plans. (July 31). with the Bank).
FSC to contract, under TORs agreed with Bank, with Banks whose implementation plans are not approved to be
international experts to support in-depth analysis of the subject to direct recapitalization, mandatory mergers, transfer
banks' implementation plans and any other submissions by of business under P&A, or exit under PCA procedures.
banks related to the provision of government financial For banks which are subject to direct recapitalization by
support (September 15). government, government will assume the responsibilities of
Adopt objectives and principles, acceptable to the Bank, to ownership, including contracting with experienced senior
be used by Govenmnent in making decisions on banks' managers to undertake restructuring, until sale to strategic
imp ementation plans, including provision of financial investors with sufficient capital and expertise to manage
support by Government (August 31). banks.
ff a plan is approved, the bank will agree on an MOU with
FSC covering, among others, recapitalization and merger
plans, measures to manage and reduce non-performing assets,
and timetable for achieving performance indicators (including
capital adequacy targets). Dividend payments to be allowed
I only when performance indicators are met.
Objectives Policy Measures
-_____________|______ -First Tranche Second Tranche
Banks whose approved plans are not, in the event, achieved
will be subject to PCA.
Evaluate remaining Initiate diagnostic reviews of remaining commercial banks If a commercial bank's capital ratio is found to be below 8%
commercial banks and take (on the basis of June 30 data) by internationally recognized as of end-June 1998, FSC will proceed on a similar basis to
appropriate actions accounting firms, signed by domestic and international that described above for 7 banks (September 30). If the capital
partners (August 15). ratio of a bank that had been above 8% subsequently falls
below 8%, FSC will invoke PCA procedures.
Based on the diagnostic review results, administrative
guidance to strengthen banks' operations will be provided.
Complete privatization of Government to agree with the lead manager selected for FSC/FSB will continue to conduct intensive supervision of
Korea First Bank and Seoul privatization on the general deal structure (including these two banks, including in-depth analysis of management
Bank confirnation to the Bank of the modalities of provision of capacity, rehabilitation strategy, and financial condition
public support), and to authorize lead manager to contact (September 30).
investors (September 15). Obtain bids for sale of the banks to strategic investors with
sufficient capital and expertise to manage banks (November 
15); achieve progress, satisfactory to the Bank, toward sale. i
Evaluate remaining merchant FSC/FSB to strengthen supervision of existing merchant Implement strengthened supervision (ongoing).
banks banks, including conducting on-site examinations to update Banks falling short of minimal capital adequacy requirements
assessment of financial condition, determine capital ratio or in substantial non-compliance with previously agreed
integrity, and assess compliance with previously approved rehabilitation plans, subject to resolution process.
rehabilitation plans (August 31).
Review specialized and Sign contracts for diagnostic reviews, including assessment Complete diagnostic reviews of at least the major specialized
development banks of asset quality, with internationally recognized accounting and development banks (December 15).
firms, as for commercial banks (September).
Use ofpublicfunds
Government confinns that public funds will be used only:
Adopt st umd principles for the * in the context of: i) FSC-approved plans developed by Firm adherence to these principles for the use of public funds
use of puiblic funds in banks for restructuring and recapitalization, whether as (ongoing).
financial system restructuring stand-alone entities or via acquisitions or mergers; ii)
and recapitalization government takeover of undercapitalized banks; or iii)
bank liquidation;
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
. with adequate burden sharing, including contribution of
new capital by qualified investors and/or dilution of
ownership interests of existing shareholders;
where acquisition of equity positions in govermnent
recapitalized banks will be through a transparent
process and open bidding (exceptions to open bidding
must have strong justification);
* where the bank is making adequate progress on
implementation of sound corporate debt restructuring;
and
* in the context of NBFI resolutions, to cover the
difference between explicitly governuent-guaranteed
liabilities and the market value of assets acquired by
purchasers, or to payoff explicitly government-
guaranteed liabilities in the case of liquidation. Any
additional use of public funds for NBFIs will be limited
to exceptional cases where failure of these institutions
poses a systemic risk. Any such use of public funds
would be made in the context of a comprehensive
restructuring plan for the relevant NBFI sector.
Resolve policy issues Purchases by KAMCO will be at prices that reflect actual Adoption by KAMCO of principles, acceptable to the Bank,
regarding and expected recovery rates as well as the opportunity cost for the disposition of troubled assets acquired by KAMCO,
asset management of the funds employed for collateralized loans, and nominal including the sale of a majority of assets within three years of
prices for unsecured loans (August 31). acquisition. Adoption of procedures, sources and instruments
of funding for KAMCO acceptable to the Bank (December
15).
Strengthen KAMCO's Agree to publish complete semi-annual and annual audited Contract with audit firm, with the first audit to be conducted
financial financial statements (which include results of reviews of on June 30, 1999 financial statement (December 15).
reporting and disclosure asset portfolio revaluations) prepared by an audit firm with
international experience in asset revaluation (August 31).
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Strengthen KAMCO's Hire qualified experts to assist in the design and Complete design and agree to implement recommended actions
infrastructure implementation of the organizatiov2! na npr,,trnl and 15)
structure based on TORs acceptable to the Bank (August Installation of system in process (ongoing).
31). Contract with at least one international asset management
Contract with data management (MIS) firm with proven company to manage and sell assets, according to TORs agreed
track record, according to TORs agreed with the Bank, for with the Bank (October 31), and have the asset management
installation of asset inventory and management company in place (December 15).
information systems (August 31).
Strengthen Supervision and
Regulation
Strengthen independence and Prepare three-year FSB operating budget. Allocate Consistent with the Basle Committee's 25 Core Principles for
authority of supervisory adequate, separate funds for FSB startup costs, and initial Effective Banking Supervision, enhance independence of
agencies operating and extraordinary expenses (including costs of FSC/FSB through ensuring operational independence and
procuring information technology, and TA needs). adequate resources. Issuance and revocation of financial
institutions' licenses to be canied out upon recommendation of
FSC. Review the adequacy and effectiveness of FSC's
governance structure and organizationi, ncluding the need for
greater representation of members nominated by independent
associations as the current FSC members' terns expire.
Establish the legal framework through which FSB may assess
fees on supervised institutions, with revenues specifically
dedicated to the operations of FSB. Evaluate funding needs
and establish FSB's internal budgetary and funding systems
(December 15).
Complete unification of supervisory organizations. Enhance
consolidated supervision and extend supervisory arrangements
for commercial banks to all NBFIs as appropriate (December).
Institutionally strengthen FSC Request proposal for contract with internationally Establish management group within FSB and implement
recognized consultant firm, according to TORs agreed with enhanced managerial structure (December 15). Implement
Bank, to implement he strategic blueprint for FSC/FSB other major elements of strategic blueprint, including
institution building, supervisory consolidation, information information systems, policies, operational procedures, human
technology, upgrade of human resources, and resources, and budgetary/administrative functions. Contract
strengthening of supervisory policies and processes signed with internationaly recognized consultant firm
(August 31). FSCIFSB to establish and operationalize a (September 30) and major elements implemented (December
special implementation task force fully dedicated to the 15).
tasks of agency consolidation and strengthening of
supervision and human resources. Task force to report to
Chairman of FSC and empowered to access personnel in
each of the 4 supervisory agencies (August 31). I
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Enhance supervision With respect to specialized and development banks, On the basis of examinations of specialized and development
delegate to FSC powers to examine and to make banks at the delegation of MOFE, FSC will make
recommendations as to consequential remedial actions for recommendations to MOFE as to any consequential remedial
these institutions (August 31). action required (ongoing).
FSB to strengthen supervisory policies, processes and
procedures for all subject financial institutions, including on-
site supervision, off-site surveillance, monitoring, and
enforcement.
Upgrade regulation Issue implementation plan to bring Korea's prudential Issue regulations to extend, effective January 1, 1999,
regulations closer to international practice as expressed in prudential rules applied to conumercial banks to specialized and
Basle Comnmittee's 25 Core Principles for Effective Bank development banks taking into account the special
Supervision (August 15). Plan will cover rules relating to characteristics of the institutions (November 15).
capital definition, loan classification, disclosure of trust Extend connected lending regulations that apply to commercial
accounts, segregation of trust accounts and treatment of banks to merchant banks. Adopt timetable for reductions in
trust accounts with guarantees as on-balance sheet items. connected lending limits; connected lending audited and
Submit legislation to amend the Act Concerning the disclosed in annual financial statements (effective January 1,
Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry, inter 1999). i 
alia, to redefine a "distressed" financial institution so as to Submit to National Assembly amendments to General Banking 
allow imposition of sanctions before actual insolvency and Act, and similar act for merchant banks, to lower single
to permit the full write down of shareholder equity (August borrower and group exposure limits over time (October 31).
31).
Improve troubled debt Issue guidelines by FSC for troubled debt restructuring and
restructuring workout processes in banks, including best practice regulations
regarding treatment of Other Assets Owned (including
maximum holding periods, yearly valuations, validation by
third-parties, and write-downs, if necessary), workout policies,
and asset management plans (October).
Rationalize deposit insurance Rationalize deposit insurance scheme, including through
phasing out of general guarantee (ongoing).
Capital Market Development
Enhance functioning and Strengthen prudential rules for securities markets'
competitiveness of securities activities of all financial institutions, including
markets strengthening standards for internal risk management,
adoption of appropriate timetable for moving to mark-to-
market accounting for all financial institutions, and use of
credit rating (August).
Develop implementation plans, with timetable to: i) Submit to National Assembly necessary changes in Securities
I promote self-regulation, including through delegation of and Exchange Law to enhance the role of SROs (December 15).
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
increased regulatory and supervisory authority to self-
regulatory orgarizations (e.g., KSE, KSDA, K1ui CA); and
ii) reform governance structure of these SROs with the aim
to promote their commercial sensitivity and independence
(September 15).
Develop implementation plan to liberalize trading systems,
including allowing for proprietary trading systems, and to Announce key elements of action plans and achieve progress in
strengthen clearing and settlement systems (September 15). implementation (December 15).
Develop bond markets As outcome of existing task force, create institutional setup Announce key elements of action plan with appropriate
to formulate an action plan, with timetable, to develop timetable to develop the bond market, including
bond markets (primary and secondary), including: standardization of new funding instruments and replacement of
development of a (rolling) three-year plan for central government-guaranteed bonds with sovereign bonds (December
government financing (including funding costs associated 15).
with financial restructuring), standardization of new Institutionally strengthen Treasury-functions (December 15).
government and government agencies' funding Introduce a framework to develop market-makers network,
instruments, and consolidation of existing instruments including adoption of minimum rules and time-table to select
(August). primary dealers in government bonds, and authorize banks to 4 :e
act as market-markers in goverment bonds (December 15). e
Develop public asset-liability Initiate external debt management component of a Implement actions of agreed program on external debt
system comprehensive, integrated external and internal public management component and complete report detailing actions
asset-liability management system (ALM), supported by with timetable to extend ALM to internal debt and contingent
Bank TA-loan (August). liability components (December 15).
Develop institutional investors Submit Securities Investment Company Act to allow,
among others, the establishment of mutual funds (August).
Submit legislation to allow asset-backed securities
(August).
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive
Directors and actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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Supplement to Policy Matrix on Financial Sector Reform
As part of the Policy Matrix on Financial Sector Reform, the Government is to adopt objectives
and principles acceptable to the Bank to be used by the Government in making decisions on the
implementation plans of the seven undercapitalized banks, and other banks so identified, including the
provision of financial support by the Govermment. The Government has adopted the following objectives
and principles:
Objectives:
* Bring in new private investors with substantial capital at risk and who are fit and proper and will
exert a positive, professional influence on bank governance.
* Bring in new managers with proven technical and managerial skills and experience to operate and
restructure banks of comparable size.
* After receiving support, banks are adequately capitalized, have adequate liquidity and are sustainably
profitable.
* Banks undergo operational restructuring in a minimum period of time, rapidly implement world-class
risk management practices, and resume normal banking activities (e.g., lending to creditworthy
firms).
e Government financial assistance to banks provided only where demonstrably less costly to the
Government than liquidation.
* Government recovers to maximum extent possible its financial assistance.
* Govermnent sells its ownership interest within shortest period possible.
Principles:
* Provision of financial support to banks by government may include equity capital contributions in the
form of cash or interest-paying financial instruments, purchase of loans, purchase of subordinated
debt, and/or guarantees on bank assets.
* Government will make transparent the criteria and processes for providing financial support.
* Government will attempt to attract new capital from qualified investors wherever possible, using the
provision of financial support as an inducement o new investment where required.
* Govermuent support will be conditional upon approved restructuring ("self-rescue") plans and efforts
by banks.
* Government will make transparent its exit strategy, including publicly announcing its commitment to
sell its ownership interests as soon as possible.
* Financial support (including direct recapitalization) will be provided only after capital has been
adjusted to reflect its true value, taking into account adequate estimates of losses in currently
identified non-performing assets (NPAs), as well as losses associated with a further deterioration in
loan quality.
* Existing shareholders of undercapitalized banks will suffer a significant dilution of their ownership
interests.
* In the case of mergers among undercapitalized banks, the government will provide financial support
in an amount necessary to increase resulting bank capital to 10% of risk-adjusted assets based on
Basle Comnuittee risk-weighting criteria, and will obtain a substantial interest in the bank (generally
80 or 90% or more).
* In the case of mergers among an adequately capitalized bank and an undercapitalized bank, the
government will provide financial support in an amount necessary to increase resulting bank capital
to the level of the adequately capitalized bank, which will in all cases exceed 8% of risk-adjusted
assets based on Basle Committee risk-weighting criteria.
* In the case of an acquisition by an adequately capitalized bank of an undercapitalized bank subject to
mandatory transfer (e.g., P&A transactions), the government will provide financial support in an
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amount necessary to increase resulting bank capital to the level of the adequately capitalized bank,
which will in all cases exceed 8% of risk-adjusted assets based on Basle Committee risk-weighting
criteria.
* In cases other than mergers and acquisitions as set out above, as an inducement to new equity capital
irnvestment the government will provide financial support in the form of equity capital in an amount
equal to equity capital contributed by new investors, in order to increase capital to 8% of risk-adjusted
assets based on Basle Committee risk-weighting criteria.
* In the case of an undercapitalized stand-alone bank where no new third-party investment is involved
but the bank is engaged in an adequate, FSC-approved self-rescue effort, the government may provide
financial support in a form other than contribution of equity capital.
* In cases other than those set out above, the government will directly recapitalize undercapitalized
banks where an analysis is performed demonstrating that liquidation is not a less costly option to
government.
KOREA: SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
POLICY MATRIX
Corporate Sector Reform
Part A: Corporate Financial Restructuring
Objectives Policy Meas res
___________________________________ First Tranche Second Tranche
1. Developframework and capacity to
do voluntary corporate workouts
(a) Provide an overall framework of FSC provides guidelines on the following:
principles and procedures. - selection of corporate restructuring candidates;
- a Corporate Restructuring Agreement ("Agreement") to
provide a structure for creditor/debtor negotiations;
- creation and operation of a Corporate Restructuring
Coordination Committee ("Coordination Committee") to
resolve inter-creditor disputes; and
- "London rules" type principles to guide voluntary
corporate workouts (July).
FSC to monitor workouts under Agreement to ensure Continued monitoring of the implementation of
consistency with the issued guidelines for workouts the framework and guidelines. 
(August). 4__
(b) Assign responsibility for leading FSC identifies Lead Banks (July).
voluntary corporate workouts. _
(c) Gain creditor support for approach to FSC obtains adherence of major creditors to Corporate
voluntary corporate workouts. Restructuring Agreement (July).
(d) Provide necessary professional Lead Banks to establish workout units (July).
resources for Lead Banks.
Lead Banks to retain internationally accredited advisors by
September 15.
(e) Provide means to resolve inter- Facilitated by FSC, banks to establish a Coordination
creditor disputes. Commnittee (July).
Coordination Committee to hire staff by August 15 and, as
necessary, retain internationally accredited advisors.
2. Provide policy supportfor corporate
restructuring
a) Curtail emergency loans While financial institutions may provide new or additional Monitor observance of the guidelines
loans to distressed but viable corporates as part of a
Corporate Restructuring Agreement workout, FSC will
provide guidelines for such lending by August 15. These
I guidelines would include the following:
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
- GOK will refrain from directing the banks to make such
loazns;
- the size of any loan would normally be limited to the
shortfall needed to meet interest expense and trade
payables during the "standstill" period;
- in return, the debtor would facilitate complete access by
the Lead Bank's financial advisors (e.g., auditors) to the
debtor's records;
- during the standstill period, the Lead Bank's financial
advisors would assess the debtor's viability, review the
debtor's liabilities and cash flow projections, and - as
appropriate - value assets and indicate how best to
maximize the return to creditors - i.e., through voluntary
workout, composition, reorganization, or liquidation.
In exceptional cases, debtors due to be restructured, but not
currently in the workout process, will require new loans. In
such cases, if the banks are agreeable to providing such
loans they will be provided per the guidelines noted above
and for a maximum initial period of six months.
(b) Facilitate use of debt/equity GOK will review if there are any tax disincentives and
conversions to address excessive regulatory impediments to the conversion of corporate debt
leverage among chaebol affiliates. into equity or near equity and will submit legislation to
National Assembly as necessary (September 15).
GOK will submit legislation to National Assembly on
mutual funds (August 30).
FSC will meet with experienced asset managers, corporate
turnaround experts, and investors in distressed securities
from the private sector to assess options for "corporate
restructuring vehicles" (CRVs). Privately financed and
managed, CRVs would purchase and/or manage corporate
equity acquired by financial institutions as a result of
debt/equity conversions. Key issues for FSC to discuss with
potential CRV managers would include appropriate business
forms for CRVs (e.g., partnerships, blind trusts, stock funds)
and potential tax, legal, and regulatory issues (August).
Objectives Policy Meas res
First Tranche Second Tranche
GOK will identify legal, tax, and regulatory impediments - Based on this review, and if necessary, GOK will
if any - to the establishment of CRVs (September 15). submit legislation to the National Assembly
enabling and regulating the formation of CRVs
and removing tax, legal, and regulatory
impediments to CRV formation and operation
(December 15).
(c) Reduce cross guarantees. FSC will encourage creditors to reduce cross guarantees Ongoing
through voluntary workouts conducted under the Corporate
Restructuring Agreement (August).
FSC will issue a communication to banks suggesting
market-based approaches for "buying out" cross guarantees.
These approaches could include, for example, conversion of
cross guarantees into guarantor's equity or equity warrants
or into a non-guaranteed loan at a higher interest rate
(August).
FSC will require financial institutions to report on the stock FSC will establish appropriate internal interim
of guaranteed loans to the 64 chaebol as of June 30, 1998, benchmarks to monitor progress toward the 
by September 15; and, starting with the fourth quarter of reduction of cross guarantees (October).
1998, FSC will require quarterly progress reports from
banks on progress in reducing cross guarantees for the 64
chaebol (August 15).
(d) Provide additional encouragement for GOK to submit to National Assembly proposed package of GOK will submit additional legislation to
corporate mergers and acquisitions, debt tax measures to encourage corporate M&As, asset sales and National Assembly removing tax disincentives to
restructuring, and asset dispositions as debt restructuring (September 15). corporate M&As, asset disposals, and debt
means of corporate restructuring. restructuring (December 15).
(e) Improve procedures and coordination GOK will establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to MOJ will agree to announce, based on the review,
for court-supervised insolvency. the Bank to review existing insolvency laws for further its draft amendments to existing insolvency laws
improvement, focusing on expedited procedures (e.g., pre- designed to promote expedited insolvency
packaged bankruptcies resulting from the workout process) procedures for public hearing and subsequent
(September 15). submission to the National Assembly by February
1999 (December 15).
FSC and MOJ, subject to agreement with the Supreme
Court, will establish a liaison committee comprising these
three entities to ensure prompt resolution of issues that
affect both voluntary restructuring and court-supervised
I insolvency (September 15).
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
3. Accelerate implementation of
complete rtri ana
(a) Complate "triage" analysis. Lead Banks will complete their assessment of chaebol Monitor follow-up.
anTiliates (including those from the top 5) that have reclived
"antilbankiptcy" loans or which are on bank "watcfc lists
and will indicate whether each is best suited for court
supervision, voluntary workout under the Corporatc
Restructuring Agreement, or normal operation (July).
A special Task Force has been convened amongst four of the Monitor follow-up.
Lead Banks to focus on a system for monitoring the top five
chaebol. The Task Force will also examine the workout
programs of the top five chaebol. The Task Force will
complete its assessment by end-September.
(b) Pursue inter-creditor agreements, First Creditors Council meetings will be convened by each Ongoing
under the Business Restructuring of the Lead Banks under terms of the Agreement
Agreement, on corporates to be (July/August).
restructured.
FSC will direct each Lead Bank to provide monthly reports Ongoing
on the status of corporate workouts (September 15).
FSC will direct the Coordination Committee to
provide monthly reports to FSC on inter-creditor
disputes and their resolution (October).
(c) Pursue a timely exit strategy for the FSC will direct Lead Banks to stop new lending and Lead Banks to provide monthly reports to FSC on
55 non-viable corporates. withdraw existing loans for each of the 55 (July). progress in exiting the 55.
(d) Identify additional non-viable FSC will require monthly updates from Lead Banks on Ongoing
corporates. additional corporates identified as non-viable during the
course of Corporate Restructuring Agreement workouts
(August). _
(e) Initiate resolution of corporates that FSC will direct Lead Banks to send auditors into chaebol Monitor follow-up.
are not under court supervision, but affiliates that have received emergency loans - but which
which have received emergency loans. are not operating under court supervision - and give the
auditors 60 days to review corporate liabilities, cash flow
projections, and asset values, assess viability. <d indicate
how to maximize the return to creditors - e.v., through
voluntary workout, composition, reorganizati m, or
I bankruptcy (August). _
Objectives Policy Meas res
First Tranche Second Tranche
(f) Expedite resolution of corporates KDB will invite international bids under transparent and Monitor next steps.
under court supervision in which the fair procedures for Kia (July). KFB will invite such bids for
GOK is a major shareholder. Hanbo by September.
(g) Develop an ability to anticipate FSC will establish a "situation room" to monitor
corporate default or insolvency. corporate/financial sector solvency (July).
(h) Promote self-restructuring by the top FSC will provide guidelines to Lead Banks to strengthen the Monitor implementation of the guidelines.
5 chaeboL. "capital structure improvement plans" of the top 5 chaebol,
including decreases in debt/equity ratios, disposal of non-
viable affiliates, and reductions in cross guarantees (July).
Fair Trade Commission will monitor and take actions Continued monitoring and enforcement.
against the top 5 chaebol that engage in anti-competitive
I intra-group transactions (July).
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive
Directors and actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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KOREA: SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
POLICY MATRIX
Corporate Sector Reform
Part B: Corporate Governance, Competition Policies, and Reform and Privatization of SOEs
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Corwrate Governance
(a) Corporate Boards and
Shareholder Rights
Promote effective monitoring of Submit to National Assembly changes to the Commercial Enact the changes to the Commercial Code.
corporate performance. Code to impose on directors and "shadow" directors a duty
to act in the interests of the company .
Require listed companies to have a minimum of 25% of
their boards comprised of outside directors.
Submit to National Assembly legislation to further reduce Enact the legislation.
the thresholds for exercise of rninority shareholder rights.
Establish a study team to provide a report and Completion of the report and submission of its
reconumendations to Government on the introduction of recommendations to Government on the introduction of class 'a
class action law suits. action law suits.
Establish a study team to provide a report and Complete the report, draft legislation to give effect to its
recommendations to Government on the role and functions recommendations, and announce a timetable acceptable to the
of boards of directors. Bank for submission to National Assembly.
Remove restrictions on the voting rights of institutional
investors in listed companies.
(b) Legal Frameworkfor Creditors'
Rights
Improve the insolvency system and Creation of bankruptcy commission to assist Seoul District
strengthen capacity to handle Court by handling aspects of insolvency litigation.
bankruptcy cases.
Appoint a task force comprising representatives of the Establish a pilot specialist bankruptcy court in Seoul with
judiciary and MOJ under TORs acceptable to the Bank to dedicated judges.
study the speedy adjudication of bankruptcy cases,
including the establishment of one or more specialist
_____ ____________________  bankruptcy courts. .
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Facilitate lending to SMEs through Establish a Task Force to design a modem system for secured
improved tools for secured lending. lending on movables and a national registry system. The Task
Force to complete its work and make its recommendations by
December 15.
(c) Financial Transparency and
Accountability
Rationalize the institutional Establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to the Bank Complete the review and remove all directives affecting
framework for setting standards, to review and recommend revisions to relevant laws and accounting and auditing standards and practices by various
regulating and overseeing the regulations to: rationalize the role of various government govemment agencies including the Bank Supervisory Board
accounting and auditing profession. agencies in supervising the accounting and auditing and Insurance Supervisory Board and consolidate appropriate
profession; strengthen the role of KICPA as a self- regulatory responsibility in the Securities Supervisory Board.
regulating body consistent with international best practice; Adopt and announce an implementation plan acceptable to the
and develop an implementation plan for establishing an Bank for the establishment of an independent accounting
independent accounting standard setting organization. standard setting organization by June 1999.
Commitment to establish an independent accounting
standard setting organization by June 1999. Submit to National Assembly amendments to applicable laws
and regulations to give effect to the recommendations of the
Task Force, including changes in CPA Law, External Audit k ;,.
Law, and Securities and Exchange Law. "
Strengthen KICPA and make it Establish a Task Force under TORs acceptable to Bank to: Complete the review and adopt a time-bound implementation
independent of govermment and the review and strengthen KICPA's charter, operational plan satisfactory to the Bank. Begin implementation of
primary source of guidance in structure and capacity; assess the appropriateness of rules recommended changes in rules and regulations. Submit to
auditing. and regulations on auditing including maximum audit fee, National Assembly amendments to applicable laws.
numerical restrictions based on CPA head count, minimum
audit contract period, evaluation of audit firms by
government, and allocation of audit clients by government;
and strengthen KICPA's role in issuing auditing standards,
monitoring professional quality, enhancing professional
ethics and enforcing the code of conduct.
Upgrade accounting and auditing Adoption and issuance by FSC of improved accounting and
standards to make them consistent auditing standards for financial institutions, listed companies
with international best practice, and joint stock companies consistent with international best
requiring that financial statements of practice and prepared with participation of representatives of
companies and financial institutions internationally recognized accounting firms, and institution
be prepared in accordance with these and announcement of the requirement that financial
improved standards with effect from statements of financial institutions, listed companies, and joint
the 1999 reporting year, as agreed stock companies with assets in excess of W7 billion will be
under SAL I. prepared and audited in accordance with these standards from
fiscal year 1999. The improved accounting standards will
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
include, inter alia, standards covering financial instruments,
leases, asset classification, troubled debt restructuring, asset
revaluation, translation of foreign currencies, loss and income
recognition, financial statement disclosure, and combined
financial statements.
Improve the financial oversight role Complete the study on introduction of audit committees of
of boards of directors and enhance boards of directors and improvement of the effectiveness of
the effectiveness of the internal audit the internal audit function for listed companies and
function. financial institutions under TORs acceptable to the Bank,
as agreed under SAL I.
Appoint a Task Force under TORs agreed with the Bank Completion of the review. Adoption and announcement of an
to: review and rationalize the function of the audit implementation plan and schedule acceptable to the Bank for
selection committee to make it an independent and the institution of a requirement for the establishment by listed
transparent entity and develop an implementation plan to companies of audit comnmittees ofboards of directors, and
upgrade it to an audit committee of boards of directors, completion of a draft of necessary changes in laws and
taking into account the conclusions of the above study; and regulations to give effect to this requirement.
recommend changes in relevant laws and regulations.
Improve the quality and frequency of Require listed companies to publish quarterly financial X
financial reporting by listed statements with adequate disclosure consistent with
companies. international best practice starting in 2000 Ql.
Competition Policies
Increase competition across all Complete draft of amendments to Fair Trade Act (FTA), Enact the amendments.
sectors. acceptable to the Bank, based on recommendations of the
Joint Public/Private Sector Committee.
Commitment o fully enforce provisions of the FTA in the KFTC to provide the Bank with a detailed report and analysis
restructuring of chaebols in accordance with the policy of all cases of chaebol M&A, divestiture and restructuring
statement issued under SAL 1. notified and considered prior to the second tranche release, in
a format agreed with the Bank.
Enact the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels.
Review and propose revisions as required to the GOK
procurement guidelines to assure transparency, and limit
opportunities for collusion and corruption.
Issue and implement comprehensive M&A guidelines. Monitor compliance, especially in chaebol restructuring.
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Strengthen the enforcement of rules Apply existing laws stringently and uniformly, and propose
limiting transactions between related amendments to the FTA to further limit such transactions.
corporations, companies, financial
institutions, their owners, directors,
shareholders and employees.
Establish a more transparent Enact legislation, satisfactory to the Bank, modifying
framework for corporate group rights restrictions under the FTA on the creation of holding company
and obligations. structures so as to permit such structures subject to conditions
to avoid undue ownership concentration.
Strengthen the operational capacity Implement the agreed work plan for the Policy Analysis Develop detailed KFTC operational guidelines (e.g.,
of KFIC. and Evaluation Group. investigative guidelines) and achieve satisfactory progress in
implementing an appropriate upgrading program.
Further deregulate domestic industry Complete submissions to the Deregulation Committee on Achieve satisfactory progress in implementing necessary
to promote competition. regulatory barriers in different industries. legislative or regulatory changes.
Promote foreign direct investment. Enact the Foreign Investment Promotion Act. Implement the new Act (simplification of procedures, e
improved support system).
Support competition in domestic Review customs clearance and product Achieve satisfactory progress in implementing the
industry by easing import certification/registration procedures and develop a plan to streamlining plan.
requirements and administration. streamline them.
Reform and Privatization of SOEs
(a) SOE Restructuring and
Governance Reforms
Ensure that SOEs that are to remain Review the Basic Law on Management of "State- Submit to National Assembly legislation to improve the
under state control or are to be Capitalized" Enterprises in order to improve management management structure of SOEs.
privatized gradually, operate in an structure of such SOEs, including the allocation of policy,
efficient and accountable manner. regulatory and ownership functions.
(b) General Privatization Program
Ensure that the Government's Announce a program of privatization, including Submit any necessary privatization legislation, including
proposed privatization and SOE identification of SOEs to be offered for sale, extent of amendments to the privatization law, to National Assembly.
reform program is implemented proposed share or asset sales and, as appropriate, proposed
within a sound framework.
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
methods and target schedule for the completion of such
proposed sales. Establish a steering committee, supported by
task forces, to oversee implementation of the privatization
program. Review need for any enabling legislation.
(c) Infrastructure Sectors
Improve regulatory and institutional Adopt and announce an overall strategy acceptable to the Satisfactory progress in implementing the privatization and
framework for increased private Bank for dealing with structural, regulatory and SOE reform program in infrastructure sectors in accordance
participation in the provision of institutional issues in privatization and SOE reform in with the principles included in the strategy statement.
infrastructure services. infrastructure sectors, including, inter alia, the priority to
be given to transition toward more competitive market
structures and establishment of appropriate regulatory
structures, and sequencing of structural, regulatory and
ownership reforms.
Undertake a study on reforms to the regulatory and Announce key elements of proposed reforms.
institutional framework for involving private participants
in greenfield infrastructure projects. *|
Telecommunications Undertake a study on reforms to pricing, interconnection Announce key elements of proposed reforms, including t4
and universal service arrangements, and the establishment timetable for implementing those reforms, prior to any further 1 8
of an independent regulatory authority. privatization of KT and, in any case, before December 15. X
Power Undertake a study on structural and regulatory reforms in Announce key elements of proposed structural and regulatory
the power sector, including the establishment of an reforms, including timetable for implementing those reforms.
independent regulatory authority.
Gas Undertake a study on structural and regulatory reforms in Announce preliminary findings of the study by December 15.
the gas sector, including the establishment of an Announce key elements of proposed structural and regulatory
independent regulatory authority. reforms, including timetable for implementing those reforms,
before proceeding with the privatization of KOGAS.
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive Directors
and actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
KOREA: SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
POLICY MATRIX
Labor Market and Social Safety Nets
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Integration of Social Policv Reform Agenda
Improve the framework for the design and Commitment to clearly mandate and adequately Establishment of a Working-Level Committee under
coordination of social safety net policies. staff the National Committee on Social Security the National Committee on Social Security, anchored
chaired by the Prime Minister, to coordinate in the Prime Minister's Office and provided with
cross-cutting reforms in social policies in order to adequate professional staff capacity, to serve as a
achieve coherence across concerned ministries focal point.
and agencies. Complete interim assessment report on cost-
effectiveness of integrating contributions to social
risk management funds for pensions, medical
insurance and unemployment insurance, including:
(a) collection mechanisms; (b) contribution base
determination; and (c) cross-checking features.
Complete interim assessment report on the aggregate
payroll tax and labor market implications of
adjustments in coverage and contribution rates for -
pensions, medical insurance and unemployment e
insurance.
Social Protection for Workers
Expand sustainable coverage of income support Extend Ul to firms with fewer than 5 workers and Adjust contribution rates if necessary in order to
provided by the unemployment insurance (Ul) to temporary and part-time workers with effect maintain financial viability of UI scheme for FY99
component of the Employment Insurance Scheme from October 1998. given anticipated unemployment rate and any
(EIS). Commitment to maintain actuarial integrity of the changes in benefit structure (per SAL I agreement).
UI scheme, i.e. positive financial reserves, and
zero leakage to other programs (per SAL I
agreement).
Increase employment by enhancing labor market Commitment to implement fully the layoff Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, on
flexibility. provisions of the 1998 Labor Standards Act so as enhancement of labor market flexibility.
to remove undue labor market impediments to
efficient corporate restructuring. Complete report providing recommendations for
appropriate expansion of public employment services
without crowding out private employment services.
Objectives Policy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Improve efficiency of active labor market Commitment to limit expenditure on ES and Complete interim evaluation report on the cost-
programs by eliminating cost-ineffective programs VAD programs by containing contribution rates effectiveness of ES and VAD programs (per SAL I
provided under the employment security (ES) and at or below current levels (0.3% for ES and agreement).
vocational ability development (VAD) components averaging 0.4% for VAD) and maintaining Hold national workshop with stakeholders to discuss
of EIS. positive financial reserves. Comnintment not to the interim evaluation report.
provide budget subsidies that increase the scope Disseminate the interim evaluation report.
of ES and VAD activities beyond self-financed Announce policy adjustments to eliminate ES and
operations. VAD programs found to be cost-ineffective
Commitment not to expand coverage of ES and
VAD programs any further.
Finalize TOR acceptable to the Bank and initiate
fornal evaluation of cost-effectiveness of ES and
VAD programs
Protecting the Poor
Expand provision of workfare for the unemployed Implement expanded Phase II of the temporary Allocate adequate FY99 budget to absorb supply of
who are not insured. public works program at wage levels designed to labor forthcoming for public works at targeted wage
target the poor jobless by self-selection. levels (not higher than Phase 11 in real terms).
Restrict participation to the unemployed who are Relax capacity constraints on workfare expansion by
not currently eligible to receive UI benefits. involving NGO and private sector contractors. 
Expand provision of means-tested noncontributory Commnitment to expand budget allocation in Allocate adequate FY99 budget.
income support for the poor. FY99 to the temporary noncontributory means-
tested allowance for the unemployed poor in line
with increases in the eligible target group.
Commitment to expand budget allocation in Allocate adequate FY99 budget.
FY99 to workfare and other forms of income
support for able-bodied beneficiaries of "self-
support" under the livelihood protection program
for the poor.
Maintain real expenditure per eligible beneficiary Initiate analytical report assessing trends in the Complete the two reports by October 30.
on existing livelihood protection programs for the 1998 inflation rate adjusted for consumption Allocate adequate FY99 budget taking into account:
poor (self-support, home care and institutional pattems of poor households. (a) adjustment of nominal per capita benefits to
care programs). Initiate analytical report assessing 1998 trends in compensate for inflation among the poor; and (b)
the number and characteristics of people living adjustment of total budget to absorb increased
in poor households. number of eligible poor.
Objectives Polic Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
Strengthen information base for regular poverty Implement special National Survey of Hold national workshop to review design options for
monitoring and analysis. Employment Assistance and Welfare Needs of a regular national multipurpose household survey,
the Unemployed (KIHASA/KLI/NSO including a panel subsample, incorporating
collaboration). comprehensive data on household welfare and
Assign institutional responsibility for coverage of government programs.
coordinating interagency inputs to design of an Complete feasibility report for introducing a regular
integrated multipurpose national household national multipurpose household survey, including
survey. questionnaire design, sample size, field operations,
policy analysis and institutional responsibilities.
Financial Risk Management for Health
Improve efficiency of financial intermediation by Complete prospective assessment report on cost- Implement consolidation plan for insurance societies
public sector health insurers through reducing the effectiveness of alternative options for under SEMI.
unit costs of administration per insured under the consolidation of the fragmented insurance
national Medical Insurance System (MIS). societies belonging to Self-Employed Medical
Insurance (SEMI) component of MIS.
Commitment to incorporate the financial
operations of MIS into the consolidated fiscal
accounting framework of the published
Government Finance Statistics for the public
sector, beginning with FY99 fiscal accounts.
Strengthen supply-side incentives for efficient Commitment to implement a universal reform of In consultation with the Bank, announce a detailed
provision of medical care. the provider payment system to improve cost timetable for implementation of the provider payment
containment incentives based on DRG-based reform plan beginning with the year 2000.
pricing.
Improve demand-side protection against major Commitment to significantly reduce by FY2000 Adopt and announce key elements of the coinsurance
financial risks for MIS beneficiaries and for poor the effective coinsurance rate for hospital reform plan, both for MIS and Medicaid, including
Medicaid beneficiaries by reducing out-of-pocket inpatient care, combined with an income-related the timetable for implementation beginning with
copayments. catastrophic cap, both for MIS and Medicaid. FY2000.
Initiate preparation of a coinsurance reform plan,
both for MIS and Medicaid, including
adjustments to special treatment changes,
inclusion of noncovered services, and
reallocation of health insurance coverage from
minor to major risks.
Objectives L Policy Measures S
First Tranche lSecond Tranche
Commitment to harmonize Medicaid provider Conmnitment to allocate adequate FY2000 budget to
reimbursement levels with MIS. implement provider reimbursement reform for
Implement an official investigation of leakages Medicaid beneficiaries.
of allocated budget funds from reaching poor Complete investigation report and initiate
beneficiaries of the Medicaid program. implementation of its reconunendations.
Diversify policy instruments for pooling financial In consultation with the Bank, finalize TORs and
risks of medical care. initiate evaluation report on introduction of Hold public workshop to review findings and
individual medical savings accounts (MSAs) to recommendations of assessment report on
finance intermediate financial risks associated introduction of MSAs.
with medical care.
Social Protection for the Elderly
Mitigate impact of the economic crisis on living Initiate analytical report assessing the Complete the analytical report and allocate adequate
standards of the elderly. effectiveness of the means-tested noncontributory FY99 budget for the social pension to achieve
"social pension" for elderly aged over 65 in effective coverage of the poor elderly target group.
terms of coverage of the target group, and
prevention of poverty among recipients.
Improve transparency and governance of financial Commitment to establish an Office or function of Establish the Office/function of the Actuary.
operations of all public pension schemes (NPS and the Actuary in the Office of the Prime Minister Allocate adequate FY99 budget to prepare and
occupational schemes for civil servants, teachers responsible for annual projections of the long- publish the first annual status report for FY98.
and military). term actuarial status of all public pension
schemes based on consistent macroeconomic and
demographic assumptions.
Commitment to incorporate the financial
operations of the Teachers and Civil Servants
pension schemes into the consolidated fiscal
accounting framework of the published
Government Finance Statistics for the public
sector, beginning with FY99 fiscal accounts.
Develop an integrated pension reform proposal Finalize TORs acceptable to the Bank governing Establish the Government Task Force by October
that fully recognizes and rationalizes the the structure, composition and mandate of the 1998 (per SAL I agreement). Commitment to
mandatory public and private components of the Government Task Force responsible for the complete draft White Paper no later than November
existing pension system. planned comprehensive White Paper on Pension 1999 (with background papers completed by June
Reform (per SAL I agreement). 1999) on an integrated pension reform package
combining public/private and mandatory/voluntary
pensions pillars designed to attain: (a) a reasonable
replacement rate target for the average worker;
Objectives P licy Measures
First Tranche Second Tranche
(b) reasonable protection from poverty for the aged; and
(c) long-term financial sustainability. Completion of
progress report on the work program of the Task Force.
Achieve more efficient allocation of National Adopt and announce a timetable for Implement the phased reduction of forced government
Pension Fund (NPF) assets. implementation of the reduction in forced appropriations from NPF agreed with the Bank, through
government appropriation of the flow of adoption of legislation satisfactory to the Bank,
NPF surpluses (per SAL I agreement) as including necessary revisions to the Public Fund
follows: 65% of the NPF surplus flow in Management Act.
1999, 40% in 2000, 20% in 2001 and 0% in Implement plan to strengthen the professional
2002. investment unit in the National Pension Corporation (per
Announce that the stock of outstanding SAL I agreement), including: (a) achievement of a high
loans to government from NPF will be standard of staff qualifications and supporting
repaid in full at maturity without rollovers. technology; and (b) adequate resources to monitor
external fund mnanagers.
In consultation with the Bank, announce Announce a schedule acceptable to the Bank for
specific guidelines for governance of NPF contracting out asset management and implement plan to X t
reserves, including: (a) the task of the asset increase gradually and substantially the share of NPS
management committee; (b) investment assets outsourced to extemal fund managers (per SAL I X 
rules and rating procedures; (c) agreement), including: (a) increased unit amount
benchmarking and reporting mechanism; outsourced per external fund manager in order to attract
and (d) index-based criteria for selecting interest of reputable firms; and (b) adoption of revised
external fund managers. criteria for selecting and recontracting external fund
managers to reflect diversification of investment risks.
Commitment to: (a) phase out per agreed timetable all
lending from NPF to program participants using their
contributions as collateral; and (b) refrain from
providing financial assistance from NPF to restructuring
_____________________________________ ________________________ of financially distressed corporations
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, actions related to the first tranche release will have been implemented before presentation of the loan to the Executive
Directors and actions related to the second tranche release will have been implemented before the release of the second tranche.
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KOREA: SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
ATTACHMENT TO POLICY MATRIX
CONDITIONS FOR BOARD PRESENTATION AND SECOND TRANCHE RELEASE
The full program of policy actions to be supported by SAL II is set out in the SAL II
Pollicy Matrix. Within this full program, a subset of key policy actions has been identified whose
implementation will be a condition for Board presentation and second tranche release. Besides
these specific policy actions, a general condition will be that the implementation of the full program
is satisfactory overall.
Conditions for Board Presentation
Within the full program detailed in the policy Matrix, the following will serve as conditions
for Board presentation:
* Adoption of objectives and principles acceptable to the Bank to be used by the Government in
making decisions on the implementation plans of the seven undercapitalized banks, and other
banks so identified, including the provision of financial support by the Govenmment.
= Agreement between the Government and the lead manager selected for the privatization of
Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank on the general deal structure (including confinration to the
Bank of the modalities of provision of public support), and authorization to the lead manager
to contact investors.
• Adoption of principles acceptable to the Bank governing the use of public resources in
financial system restructuring and recapitalization.
X Issuance of guidelines to financial institutions by FSC, satisfactory to the Bank, limiting the
extension of "emergency" loans to corporations.
* Commitment o establish an independent accounting standard setting organization by June
1999.
* Adoption and announcement of an overall strategy acceptable to the Bank for dealing with
structural, regulatory and institutional issues in privatization and SOE reform in infrastructure
sectors, including, inter alia, the priority to be given to transition toward more competitive
market structures and establishment of appropriate regulatory structures, and sequencing of
structural, regulatory and ownership reforms.
* Extension of unemployment insurance to firms with fewer than five workers and to temporary
and part-time workers, with effect from October 1998.
6 Adoption and announcement of a timnetable agreed with the Bank for the reduction of forced
government appropriation of the flow of National Pension Fund surpluses, and annoiuncement
of the Government's comniitnent that the stock of its outstanding borrowings from NPF will
be repaid in full at maturity without rollovers.
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Conditions for Second Tranche Release
Within the full program detailed in the Policy Matrix, the following will serve as
conditions for release of the second tranche, in addition to the general requirement of overall
satisfactory progress in carrying out the full program.
* Maintenance of a sound macroeconomic framework, consistent with the objectives of the
Program, as determined on the basis of indicators agreed to by the Borrower and the Bank.
* In consultation with the Bank, adoption of process and principles necessary to ensure that
adequate public resources will be made available by the Government for use in financial
system recapitalization and restructuring.
* Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, toward sale by the Government of majority
ownership in Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank through a biding process satisfactory to the
Bank.
* Adoption by KAMCO of principles, acceptable to the Bank, for the disposition of troubled
assets acquired by KANICO, including the sale of a majority of assets within three years of
acquisition. Adoption of procedures, sources and instruments of funding for KAMCO
acceptable to the Bank.
* (a) Adoption and issuance by FSC of improved accounting and auditing standards for financial
institutions, listed companies and joint stock companies consistent with international best
practice and prepared with participation of representatives of internationally recognized
accounting firms, and institution and announcement of the requirement that financial
statements of financial institutions, listed companies, and joint stock companies with assets in
excess of W7 billion will be prepared and audited in accordance with these standards from
fiscal year 1999. (b) Adoption and announcement of an implementation plan acceptable to the
Bank for the establishment of an independent accounting standard setting organization by June
1999.
* Adoption and announcement of a plan and schedule acceptable to the Bank for the institution
of a requirement for the establishment by listed companies of audit committees of boards of
directors, and completion of a draft of necessary changes in laws and regulations to give effect
to this requirement.
* Enactment of amendments to the Fair Trade Act, acceptable to the Bank, to enhance
competition in the domestic economy, based on the recommendations of the Joint
Public/Private Sector Committee.
* Enactment of the Act on Comprehensive Regulation of Cartels.
* Enactment of legislation, satisfactory to the Bank, modifying restrictions under the Fair Trade
Act on the creation of holding company structures so as to permit such structures subject to
conditions to avoid undue ownership concentration.
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* Achievement of progress, satisfactory to the Bank, on enhancement of labor market flexibility.
* Allocation of amounts in the 1999 budget sufficient o: (a) expand the public works program to
absorb the supply of labor forthcoming at targeted wage levels (not higher in real terms than
under Phase II of this program); (b) expand the provision of means-tested non-contributory
income support for the unemployed poor in line with the increase in the eligible target group;
(c) expand workfare and other forms of income support for able-bodied beneficiaries of "self-
support" under the livelihood protection program; and (d) at least maintain in real terms the
level of expenditure per beneficiary under the existing livelihood protection programs for the
poor.
* Implementation of the phased reduction of forced government appropriations from the National
Pension Fund agreed with the Bank, through adoption of legislation satisfactory to the Bank,
including necessary revisions to the Public Fund Management Act.
KOREA
SECOND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LOAN
ANNEX 2
STATISTICS
Table 1. Korea: Macroeconomic Framework, 1992-98
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 sL 1998"o
Real GDP growth (percent change) 5.1 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.5 -5.0
Consumption 6.8 5.3 7.0 7.2 6.9 3.5 -10.3
Gross fixed investment -0.8 5.3 12.0 11.7 7.1 -3.5 -30.6
Stockbuilding ' -0.5 -1.0 1.4 -0.5 1.2 -3.7 -3.9
Net exports I/ 1.7 1.4 -1.7 0.5 -0.8 8.6 15.8
Saving and investment (in percent of GDP)
Gross domestic investment 36.6 35.1 35.8 37.0 38.4 35.0 22.4
Gross national saving 35.3 35.4 34.8 35.2 33.7 33.1 34.3
Current account balance -1.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.9 -4.7 -1.9 11.9
Prices (percent change)
Average CPI inflation 6.2 4.8 6.3 4.5 4.9 4.5 8.5
End-period CPI inflation 4.6 5.8 5.6 4.7 4.9 6.6 7.2
GDP deflator 6.1 5.1 5.5 5.6 3.4 2.4 6.1
Exchange rate (Won/U.S.S) (ave.) 780.7 802.7 803.5 771.3 804.5 951.3
Consolidated central governuent (in percent of GDP)
Revenues 18.2 19.3 20.2 20.7 21.9 22.0 23.0
Expenditures 31 18.9 19.0 19.7 20.3 21.6 21.9 28.1
Overall balance -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 -5.1
Money and credit (end of period)
M3 growth 21.8 19.0 24.7 19.1 16.7 13.9 13.5
Reserve money growth 10.9 27.5 9.2 16.3 -12.2 -12.5 13.9
Three-year corporate bond yield 16.2 12.6 12.9 11.7 12.6 24.3
Trade (percent change)
Export volume 8.1 7.0 14.8 24.0 19.8 24.9 17.8
Import volume 2.0 1.4 21.5 21.3 12.7 1.5 -19.6
Terms of trade 0.3 -1.1 1.5 -3.5 -12.3 -11.3 -3.3
Balance of payments (in billions of US$)
Exports, fo.b. 76.2 82.1 95.0 124.6 130.0 138.6 139.5
Imports, fo.b. -78.0 -79.8 -97.8 -129.1 -144.9 -141.8 -99.2
Current account balance -3.9 1.0 -3.9 -8.5 -23.0 -8.2 35.0
Usable reserves import cover 4' 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.0 0.6 4.1
External debt (billions of US$)
Total external debt3 .. 67.0 88.7 119.7 157.5 154.4 153.8
Of which: Short-term .. 40.3 58.4 78.7 100.0 68A 43.0
Extemal debt in percent of GDP .. 20.1 23.3 26.2 32.5 34.4 52.1
Source: Bank of Korea
1/ Contribution to GDP.
2/ In the light of more recent developments, growth forecasts are being revised. For 1998, a decline in GDP of around 7% now appears more likely.
3/ Including bank restructuring costs and additional unemployment-related expenditures agreed to under the Tripartite Accord.
4/ Months of imports of goods and nonfactor services; excludes BOK deposits at overseas branches and subsidiaries of Korean banks.
5/ Includes offshore bonowing of domestic financial institutions and debt contracted by overseas branches of domestic fnancial institutions.
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Table 2. Korea: Balance of Payments and Financing Requirements, 1993-98
(In billions of U.S. dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 EtL 1998 Pr<ti
Current account balance 1.0 -3.9 -8.5 -23.0 -8.2 35.0
Trade balance 2.3 -2.9 -4.4 -15.0 -3.2 40.3
E.xports 82.1 95.0 124.6 130.0 138.6 139.5
Imports 79.8 97.8 129.1 144.9 141.8 99.2
Services, income and transfers (net) -1.3 -1.0 4.1 -8.0 -5.0 -5.3
CaFital accoumt balance 2.0 8.5 15.6 23.9 -28.0 -14.9
Direct investment (net) -0.8 -1.7 -1.8 -2.3 -1.6 0.4
Equity securities (net) 6.4 3.2 4.0 5.3 -1.3 3.1
Net official borrowing -1.8 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.6
Net private medium and long-term capital2' 3/ 2.2 2.0 8.2 11.3 14.6 16.9
Trade credits -1.0 2.7 3.1 3.7 -2.5 -10.0
Net private short-term capital 4' 5/ 1.6 8.5 10.7 11.8 -28.7 -22.2
Deposits/currency -1.3 -1.6 -1.7 -2.6 0.1 0.3
Other -3.4 4.5 -5.3 -3.9 -3.4 0.7
Errors and omissions -0.7 -1.8 -1.2 1.1 -5.1 -3.3
Overall balance 3.0 4.6 7.0 0.9 -36.1 20.1
Financing .. .. .. .. 15.8 13.8
IMF purchases/repurchases 6I .. .. .. .. 10.9 5.1
World Bank/ADB funding .. .. .. .. 4.9 4.7
Support from official bilateral creditors .. .. .. .. 0.0 0.0
Mitrket borrowing by government .. .. .. .. 0.0 4.0
Remaining financing gap .. .. .. .. 0.0 0,0
Change in usable reserves (- increase) 71 -3.0 -4.6 -7.0 -0.9 20.3 -33.9
Memorandum items:
Current account balance
(as a percent of GDP) 0.3 -1.0 -1.9 -4.7 -1.9 11.9
Usable gross reserves 20.2 25.6 28.5 29.4 9.1 43.0
Usable reserve cover (months of
imports of goods and nonfactor
services) 7" 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.0 0.6 4.1
Ratio of short-term debt
to usable reserves a' 2.0 2.3 2.8 3.4 7.5 1.0
Souire: Bank of Korea
1/ In the light of more recent developments, the balance of payments forecast for 1998 is being revised. A current account surplus
of $37.40 billion now seems more likely.
2/ Includes domestic financial institutions $22 billion of financial institutions' short-term debt was converted to medium term loans
in April 1998.
3/ Assumes 100 percent rollover of corporate debt in 1998.
4/ Including $22 billion of financial institutions' short-term debt converted to medium-term loans in April 1998.
5/ Adjusted upward to include the impact of foreign currency liquidity support by the Bank of Korea to overseas branches of DMBs
in 1995-97.
6/ Gross purchases from 1MF in 1998 are programmed at $7.9 billion.
7/ Adjusted to exclude the impact of foreign currency liquidity support by the Bank of Korea to overseas branches of DMBs.
S/ Including IMF, offshore borrowing of domestic financial institutions and debt contracted by overseas branches of domestic
finanial institutions.
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Table 3. Korea: Summary of Consolidated Central Government Operations, 1992-98
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 LA 1998'j
(In trillions of won)
Total revenue 43.8 51.5 61.7 72.8 85.5 92.6 97.4
Tax revenue 35.4 39.4 47.2 56.8 65.0 69.9 68.6
Social security contributions 2.4 4.1 4.6 5.4 7.4 8.3 10.6
Nontax revenue and capital income 6.0 8.0 9.9 10.6 13.1 14.5 18.2
Expenditures 45.5 50.7 60.3 71.6 84.4 92.2 118.9
Current expenditures 35.4 39.1 45.7 49.9 55.4 62.8 80.5
Capital expenditures and net lending 10.1 11.6 14.6 21.7 29.0 29.4 38.4
Overall consolidated central government balance -1.7 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.4 -21.5
(In percent of GDP)
Total revenue 18.2 19.3 20.2 20.7 21.9 22.0 23.0
Tax revenue 14.7 14.8 15.4 16.1 16.7 16.6 16.2
Social security contributions 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.5
Nontax revenues and capital income 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.4 4.3
Expenditures 18.9 19.0 19.7 20.3 21.6 21.9 28.1
Current expenditures 14.7 14.6 14.9 14.2 14.2 14.9 19.0
Capital expenditures and net lending 4.2 4.3 4.8 6.1 7.4 7.0 9.1
Overall consolidated central government balance -0.7 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 -5.1
Memorandum item:
Nominal GDP (in trillion won) 240.4 267.1 306.0 352.0 390.0 421.0 423.6
Source: Ministy of Finance and Economy
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Table 4. Korea: Reserve Money and Financial Survey, 1992-98
(In billions of won; end of period)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Est 1998 Proj.
Bank of Korea
Net foreign assets 1/ 13,530 16,395 20,303 25,419 24,940 -3,300 33,410
Assets 14,391 17,412 21,607 26,068 25,570 10,010 55,900
Liabilities -861 -1,017 -1,304 -649 -630 -13,310 -22,490
Net domestic assets 4,577 6,684 4,901 3,886 782 25,819 -7,770
Public sector 2 -1,403 -1,762 -3,197 -4,307 -3,991 2,266 9,479
Private financial sector 32,170 36,789 37,397 37,233 37,372 85,529 63,106
Other items -26,190 -28,341 -29,298 -29,039 -32,599 -61,976 -80,355
Reserve money 18,107 23,080 25,204 29,306 25,722 22,519 25,640
FinancislI survey
Netforeignassets 6,007 9,156 9,421 9,214 470 -21,049 18,541
Net domestic assets 292,271 345,777 433,242 517,803 614,491 721,333 776,281
Public sector v 8,764 11,248 11,383 8,979 9,616 8,899 9,060
Private sector 299,390 352,872 443,855 528,981 628,444 747,307 811,668
Other items 3/ -15,883 -18,343 -21,997 -20,157 -23,568 -34,873 -44,447
Total liquidity (M3) 298,277 354,933 442,663 527,017 614,962 700,284 794,822
Memorandum items:
Reserve money 4/
Twelve-month percent change 10.9 27.5 9.2 16.3 -12.2 -12.5 13.9
M3
Twelve-monthpercentchange 21.8 19.0 24.7 19.1 16.7 13.9 13.5
Source: ]3ank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin.
1/ 1997 fi,gure is valued at program exchange rates; projections for 1998 are made under baseline assumptions about accumulation
of foreign reserves and purchases/repurchases from the IMF.
2/ Government, government agencies and official entities.
3/ Decline in 1997 reflects Bank of Korea marking to market foreign currency denominated assets (including foreign exchange
deposits at DMBs).
4/ Between April 1996 and February 1997, the (average) required reserve ratio was reduced from 9.4 percent o 3.3 percent.
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Table 5. Korea: Stock of External Liabilities by Maturity and Borrower, 1995-98
(In billions of U.S dolars)
July
1995 1996 1997 1998
Short-Term Liabilities 78.7 100.0 68.4 38.4
I. Financial institutions 63.1 78.0 43.8 19.6
A. Domestic fiancial institutions 1 52.1 65.2 28.9 10.8
Resident domestic fmancial institutions2 ' 18.7 26.2 11.7 7.0
Offshore banking of domestic financial institutions 3t 8.4 12.7 8.7 1.2
Overseas branches and subsidiaries 25.0 26.4 8.5 2.6
of domestic financial institutions 4/
B. Branches of foreign banks 5/ 11.0 12.8 14.9 8.8
II. Domestic corporations 61 7/ 15.6 22.0 24.7 18.8
Medium and Long-Term Liabilities 41.0 57.5 86.0 113.9
I. Financial institutions 27.5 41.5 50.4 63.2
A. Domestic fmancial institutions 25.5 38.3 46.4 57.3
Resident domestic financial institutions 2 17.6 24.5 29.9 34.2
Offshore banking of domestic financial institutions 3/ 4.2 8.5 9.2 14.3
Overseas branches anid subsidiaries 3.7 5.3 7.3 8.8
of domestic financial institutions 4/
B. Branches of foreign banks 5' 2.0 3.2 4.0 5.9
II. Domestic corporations 61 7/ 10.5 13.6 17.6 20.0
IH. Public sector 3.0 2.4 18.0 30.7
Total External Liabilties 119.7 157.5 154.4 152.3
Source: Bank of Korea, and Ministry of Finance and Economy.
1/ Includes commercial banks, specialized banks, merchant banks, and development institutions.
2/ Includes commercial paper, call money, refnance, and term loans.
3/ Domestic financial institutions' hort-term offshore borrowings, excluding interoffice account borrowings.
4/ Domestic financial institutions' overseas branches and subsidiaries excluding interoffice accounts.
The data in the table exclude the nonresident deposits in the overseas branches and subsidiaries of domestic financial
institutions.
5/ Includes nonresident deposits, call money, refinance, term loan and interoffice account borrowings.
6/ Includes trade credit, loans for oil imports, and advance receipts of exports.
7/ In line with intemational standards, these data exclude nonresident subsidiaries of Korean corporations.
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Table 6. Korea: Medium-Term Projections, 1998-2003
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Nainal Accounts (percent change)
Total consumption 3.5 -10.3 -0.6 2.2 4.0 4.5 5.1
Gross fixed investment -3.5 -30.6 3.6 6.5 9.0 7.7 7.9
Total domestic demand -2.8 -22.2 1.4 4.5 6.0 6.0 6.4
Netexports " 8.6 15.7 -1.1 -0.5 0.2 0.9 0.8
Gross domestic product 5.5 -5.0 2' 0.0 21 3.0 4.9 5.6 6.0
Conuumerprices(percentchange) 4.5 8.5 4.3 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.1
Savings and investment (percent of GDP)
Grossnationalsavings 33.1 34.3 32.8 32.5 32.9 33.7 34.5
Gross domestic investment 35.0 22.4 26.9 28.7 30.4 31.7 32.8
Cunrent account balance -1.9 11.9 5.9 3.8 2.5 2.0 1.7
Trade (percent change)
Merchandise exports 6.7 0.6 3.3 6.0 7.6 7.7 8.1
Volumes 3/ 24.9 17.8 7.0 7.1 7.4 7.4 7.4
Merchandise imports -2.2 -30.1 15.6 12.2 11.0 10.2 10.2
Volumes 3" 1.5 -19.7 14.8 12.7 11.0 9.8 9.7
Tens oftrade -11.3 -1.3 -4.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.2
Bahnce of Payments (In billion U.S.S)
Merchandise exports 138.6 139.5 144.0 152.6 164.2 176.8 191.2
Merchandise imports -141.8 -99.2 -114.7 -128.7 -142.9 -157.5 -173.6
Trade balance -3.2 40.3 29.3 23.9 21.3 19.3 17.6
Current account -8.2 35.0 21 19.8 13.5 9.7 8.7 8.1
Usable gross reserves 9.1 43.0 64.9 76.0 87.4 100.1 114.5
]Inmonthsofinports 4 0.6 4.1 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.5
Externaldebt(U.S.Sbillion)" 154.4 153.8 154.1 159.2 161.9 164.9 169.9
InpercentofGDP 34.9 51.2 46.3 44.8 41.3 38.4 36.1
Short-termexternaldebt(U.S.$billion)" 68.4 43.0 44.5 47.0 49.8 52.5 54.1
]Ratio to usable reserves 7.5 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
]Debtserviceratio 6 8.9 8.9 12.9 9.4 8.7 7.8 7.5
Conmolidated central government (in percent of GDP)
Revenues 22.0 23.0 23.3 23.4 23.6 23.8 24.0
Expenditures 7' 21.9 28.1 28.3 27.0 26.4 26.1 25.9
Overall balance 0.1 -5.1 -5.0 -3.6 -2.8 -2.3 -1.9
Government debt 13.6 28.0 39.0 40.7 40.4 39.8 38.8
Soarce: Bank of Korea and Intemational Monetary Fund.
1/ Contribution to GDP.
2/ In the light of more recent developnments, growth forecasts are being revised. For 1998 and 1999, declines in GDP of around 7% and 1%,
respectively, now appear more likely. Also, the current account surplus for 1998 is being revised upwards to $37-40 billion.
3/ Customs clearance basis.
4/ Goods and nonfactor services.
5/ Icluding IMF, offshore borrowing of domestic financial institutions and debt contracted by overeas branches of domestic financial
institutions.
6/ Medium- and long4enn debt; in percent of exports of goods and nonfactor services.
7/ Includes bank restrmcturing costs and additional unemployment-related expenditures.
8/ Includes bonds issued for bank restructuring.
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Table 7. Korea: Assets of the Financial System, 1993-97
1997
1993 1995 1997 (In percent of total
(In trillions of won) financial system assets)
Deposit Money Banks 408.7 591.5 861.7 57.9
Nation-wide Commercial Banks 151.0 225.0 379.0 25.5
Trust Accounts of commercial banks l' 133.1 212.1 288.0 19.3
Local Commercial Banks 29.3 44.2 58.7 3.9
Foreign Banks 14.6 19.4 45.8 3.1
Specialized Banks 2' 80.7 90.8 90.2 6.1
Nonbank Financial Institutions 229.8 316.2 492.0 33.0
Development Institutions 51.8 70.5 149.0 10.0
Korea Development Bank 35.9 47.8 106.1 7.1
Export Import Bank of Korea 4.4 6.7 21.4 1.4
KoreaLong-Term CreditBank 11.5 16.0 21.5 1.4
Investment Institutions 97.4 130.2 186.6 12.5
Merchant Banks 33.1 45.9 77.6 5.2
Investment Trust Companies 59.1 76.0 102.6 6.9
Korea Securities Finance Corporation 5.2 8.3 6.4 0.4
Savings Institutions 80.6 115.5 156.4 10.5
Mutual Credits 28.7 42.0 62.0 4.2
Mutual Savings and Finance Companies 23.4 32.6 36.0 2.4
Credit Unions 8.5 13.2 19.3 1.3
Community Credit Cooperatives 14.4 20.7 29.8 2.0
Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance 5.6 7.0 9.3 0.6
Contractual Savings Institutions 65.7 94.0 135.0 9.1
Life Insurance Companies 48.8 67.0 92.5 6.2
Loans 24.6 31.7 44.6 3.0
Securities 13.8 18.9 23.0 1.5
Others 10.4 16.4 24.9 1.7
Pension Funds3/ 16.9 27.0 42.5 4' 2.9
Loans 6.5 14.0 24.9 1.7
Securities 7.0 8.1 9.3 0.6
Others 3.4 4.9 8.3 0.6
Total Financial System 704.2 1,001.7 1,488.7 100.0
Sources: Bank of Korea, National Pension System, Korea Teacher's Pension Corporation, Government Employees Pension Corporation,
Ministry of Defense, and OECD Institutional Investors 1997.
1/ Trust account business is carried out by the commercial banks but classified by the BOK as non-bank fmancial intermediation.
2/ Korea Housing Bank became a commercial bank in August 1997.
3/ Includes the National Pension System, Korea Teacher's Pension, Military Pension, Government Employees Pension and Korean
Teacher's Mutual Fund.
4/ Actual for the National Pension System and estimates for the other funds.
ANNEX 2
Table 8: Korea: Summary of Privatization and Restructuring Plans
for Major SOEs Announced in July and August 1998
Enterprise Revenue Employees Gov't Privatization and Restructuring Plan
(in billion Ownership
Won) (%)
Infrastructure and Related Enterprises
Korea Electric Power 13,400.0 34,879 58.2 Divest from unrelated businesses and
Corp contract-out construction of new power
plants (other than nuclear) and co-
generation plants. By end-October
1997, complete plan to restructure the
industry. By end-1998, sell 5% of
common shares; In 1999, sell a fixed
number of existing power plants.
Korea Telecom Corp 7,785.2 58,556 71.2 Resctructure business operations. Sell
or contract-out satellite communications
and telegram services; withdraw from 8
business areas. Before end 2000: issue
10% of new shares to strategic investor;
international public offering of up to
18%; partial offering to employees and
institutional investors. After 2000: sell
33.4% of remaining shares.
Korea Gas Corp 2,926.6 2,891 50.2 Restructure KOGAS and promote
competition in the gas industry.
Contract-out non-core business
activities. By 1999, complete public
offering of shares in magnitude of 250
b.w. By 2000, introduce open access
system. By 2002, complete
privatization.
Korea District Heating 202.6 1,001 46.1 Focus on core business, reorganize
Corp business units and reduce workforce. In
1999, sell two co-gen plants. By 2001,
sell 51% or more of shares.
Daehan ODil Pipeline Corp 33.6 386 48.8 Improve competitiveness, operate
branches as separate accounting centers,
and adopt early retirement plan. Divest
government equity by 2000.
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Enterprise Revenue Employees Gov't Privatization and Restructuring Plan
(in billion Ownership
Won)
Other Enterprises
Pohang Iron and Steel 9,718.1 19,294 3.1 Sell 26.7% of shares, subject to 3%
Corp (plus 23.57 individual ownership limitation until
held 2001.
indirectly)
Korea Heavy Industries & 3,070 7,851 n.a. Fully privatize: international open
Construction Corp (held bidding, plus sale to employees.
indirectly)
Korea Tobacco & 4,243.4 7,573 35.3 Undertake comprehensive restructuring.
Ginseng Corp Separate ginseng business from
cigarette business by end 1998.
Dramatically reduce number of cigarette
manufacturing and leaf processing
plants and sell non-operating plants. In
1998 and 1999, sell 25% of shares to
domestic and foreign investors, with
special allotment to employees and an
individual ownership limitation of 7%;
In 2000, remove individual ownership
limitation and monopoly over cigarette
production.
Korea Technology 438.4 163 10.2 Sale through open bidding.
Banking Corp
National Textbook Corp 51.7 739 40 By end-1998, full divestiture.
(plus 46.5%
indirect)
Korea General Chemistry 14 275 n.a. Dispose of shares in Namhae Chemical
Corp (98.8 held Corp. through trade sale.
indirectly) Sell remaining assets of KGCC.
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IBRD Loans and IDA Credits in the Operations Portfolio
Difference
between expected and Last ARPP
Loan or Fiscal Original amount in S million actual disbursements upervision rating
Project l) Credit No. Year Borrower Purpose IBRD IDA Canceled Undisb. Orig. Frm Rev'd Dev Obi -Imp Prog
Number of Closed Loans/Credits: 124
Active Loans
KR-PE-4170 13RD36130 1993 Rep.of Korea PtrlDist&SecMgmt. 120.0 0.0 0.0 19.8 19.8 19.8 S S
KR-PE-4171 IBRD 36120 1993 Rep. of Korea Environ. Research & Engr. 60.0 0.0 0.0 7.5 8.3 0.0 HS HS
KR-PE4169 IBRD 35900 1993 Rep. of Korea Seoul & Kwangju Sewerage 110.0 0.0 64.4 9.8 74.2 -0.8 S S
KR-PE4174 IBRD 36940 1994 Rep. of Korea Environment Technology Dev. 90.0 0.0 0.0 5.2 7.3 0.0 HS S
KR-PE-4168 IBRD 36930 1994 Rep. of Korea Science & Technology Educ. Sector 190.0 0.0 0.0 33.1 3.4 0.0 HS HS
KR-PE-4172 IBRD 36890 1994 Rep. of Korea Financial Intermediation 100.0 0.0 0.2 1.1 1.3 0.7 S S
KR-PE-35079 IBRD 38300 1995 Rep. of Korea Waste Disposal Project 75.0 0.0 0.0 55.5 41.0 0.0 S S
KR-PE-4175 IBRD 38280 1995 Rep. of Korea Pusan Urban Transp. & Mgmt. 100.0 0.0 0.0 34.9 23.2 0.0 HS HS
KR-PE-4173 IBRD 37930 1995 Rep. of Korea Ports Development & Environment 100.0 0.0 3.1 55.9 47.7 0.0 S S
KR-PE-56796 IBRD 43850 1999 Rep. of Korea Fin. and Corp. Restructuring 48.0 0.0 0.0 48.0 0.0 0.0
Total 993.0 0.0 67.6 270.7 226.2 19.7
Active Loans Closed Loans Total Loans
Total Disbursed (IBRD and IDA): 655 12,185 12,840
of which has been repaid: 0 6,228 6,228
Total now held by IBRD and IDA: 925 5,957 6,882
Amount Sold: 0 132 132
of which repaid: 0 132 132
Total Undisbursed: 271 0 271
a/ Intended disbursements to date minus actual disbursemnents o date as projected at appraisal.
b/ Following the FY94 Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP), a letter based system was introduced (HS = highly satisfactory, S = satisfactory, U = unsatisfactory,
HU - highly unsatisfactory): see Proposed Improvements in Project and Portfolio Performance Rating Methodology (SecM94-90 1), August 23, 1994.
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Korea: Statement of IFC'S Committed and Disbursed Portfolio
(in USS ndmlLon)
Committed Disbursed
FY Aproval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic Loan Equity Quasi Partic
1968/74/76/77/o7880/ KLTCB 0.0 15.1 25.0 0.0 0.0 15.1 25.0 0.0
90/94/98
1971/74/76n7918082/85/89/ Hana Bank 20.0 21.6 30.0 0.0 0.0 21.6 30.0 0.0
91/94/97/00
1974/76177/79180/84/85/ LG Electronics 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.4 0.0 0.0
87/88/89/91/92/93/96
1977/79/87/90 KDLC 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0
1983/91 KDIC 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0
1985 KDIC-Seoshin 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
1985 KDIC-SK Chemical 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Total Portfolio: 20.0 51.5 55.0 0.0 0.0 51.5 55.0 0.0
Approvals Pending Commitment
Loan Equity Quasi Partic
1998 H&QKorea 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0
1998 Hana Bank 0.0 21.9 0.0 0.0
Total Pending Commitment 0.0 51.9 0.0 0.0
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Korea at a glance
East
POVERTY and SOCIAL Asia & High-
Korea Pacific Income Development diamond'
1997
Population, mid-year (millions) 46.0 1,753 926 Life expectancy
GNP per capita (Atlas method, US$) 10,550 970 25,700
GNP (Atlas method, US$ billions) 485.3 1,707 23,802
Average annual growth, 1991-97
Population (%) 1.0 1.3 0.7
Labor force (%/6) 1.9 1.4 0.9 GNP Gross
per ! primary
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1991-97) capita enrollment
Poverty (% of population below national poverty line)
Urban population (5/ of total populabion) 83 32 76
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72 69 78 1
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 9 38 6 1
Child malnutrition (% of children under 5) .. 16 Access to safe water
Access to safe water (% of population) 89 84 94
Illiteracy (% of population age 15+) 2 17 <5 I
Gross primary enrollment (%of school-age population) 101 115 103 Korea
Male 100 118 104 j High-income group
Female 101 116 103
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS
1976 1986 1996 1997
Economic ratiosa
GDP (US$ billions) 29.1 108.6 484.6 442.5
Gross domestic investment/GDP 26.7 28.7 38.4 35.0
Exports of goods and services/GDP 31.0 37.6 32.4 38.1 Trade
Gross domestic savings/GDP 24.9 34.6 34.5 34.2
Gross national savings/GDP 24.2 32.9 33.7 33.1
Current account balance/GDP -1.1 4.3 -4.7 -1.9
Interest payments/GDP 1.5 2.7 0.5 0.5 Domestic I Investment
Total debt/GDP 35.5 43.0 32.5 34.9 Savings
Total debt service/exports 11.0 27.3 5.9 6.0
Present value of debt/GDP .. ..
Present value of debt/exports ..
Indebtedness
1976-86 1987-97 1996 1997 1998-02
(average annual growth)
GDP 6.9 7.6 7.1 5.5 3,5 Korea --- High-income group
GNP per capita 5.2 6.5 5.5 3.9 2.8
Exports of goods and services 10.7 11.8 13.0 23.6 7.2
STRIJCTURE of the ECONOMY
1976 1986 1996 1997 Growth rates of output and investment (%)
(% of GDP)
Agriculture 23.5 11.2 6.3 5.7 20
Industry 34.6 42.1 42.9 42.9 j 19
Manufacturing 27.4 30.8 25.9 25.7 | o
Services 41.9 46.8 50.8 51.4 + 92 93 94 95 96
Privaite consumption 64.2 55.4 54.8 54.6 -20
General govemment consumption 10.9 10.0 10.7 11.1 G OGDP
Imports of goods and services 32.8 31.7 36.3 38.8
1976-86 1987-97 1996 1997 Growth rates of exports and imports I%)
(average annual growth)
Agriculture 1.4 1.3 4.0 2.5 25
tndustry 10.1 8.3 7.4 5.6 20
Manufacturing 10.7 7.9 7.4 6.2 15
Services 6.8 8.1 7.2 5.9 10
Private consumption 6.2 7.9 6.8 3.1 s
Genieral government consumption 4.0 5.9 7.8 5.7 0-l ----- - -_
Gross domestic investment 7.4 9.2 10.3 -12,8 92 93 94 95 96 97
Imports of goods and services 7.8 13.9 14.8 3.8 Exports r0imports
Gross national product 6.7 7.6 6.8 4.9 _
Note: 1997 data are preliminary estimates. Regional aggregate data exclude high-income economies.
- The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group average. If data are missing, the diamond will
be incomplete.
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PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE
1976 1986 1996 1997 Inflation (%)
DomesUic prices
12(% change) 10
Consumer prices 15.4 2.8 4.9 4.5 8
Implicit GDP deflator 22.4 4.6 3.4 2.4 6
4Government finance 2
(% of GDP, includes current grants) o
Current revenue 16.0 16.4 19.3 19.5 92 93 94 95 96 97
Current budget balance 3.6 3.0 5.1 4.8 -GDP deflator -0-cPI
Overall surplus/deficit -1.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1
TRADE
1976 1986 1996 1997 Export and Import levels (USS millions)(US$ millions)I
Total exports (fob) 7,715 34,714 129,715 136,164 160,000-
Mineral fuels .. .. 3,873 5,349 140,000 i
Chemicals .. .. 9,166 10,666 120,000
Manufactures .. .. 106,973 109,238 100,000
Total imports (cif) 6,774 31,584 150,339 144,166 90,000
Food . .. 7,265 6,517 00,000,
40,000,Fuel and energy . .. 24,284 27,381 20,000
Capital goods 54,675 48,722 0
Export price index (1995=100) 69 102 87 73 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Import price index (1995=100) 70 94 99 94 e Exports to Imports
Terms of trade (1995=100) 99 109 88 78
BALANCE ofPAYMENTS
1976 1986 1996 1997 [Current account balance to GDP ratio (%)
(US$ millions) I 
Exports of goods and services 9,341 39,409 153,380 164,921 1 I
Imports of goods and services 9,595 33,758 174,524 171,300 1
Resource balance -254 5,651 -21,144 -6,379 93
Net income -402 -2,310 -1,815 -2,454
Net current transfers 346 1,369 -46 667 -2
Current account balance -310 4,709 -23,005 -8,166 -3
Financing items (net) 1,623 -4,755 23,905 -12,134 -4
Changes in net reserves -1,313 46 -900 20,300
Memo:
Reserves including gold (US$ millions) 1,975 3,351 29,400 9,100
Conversion rate (DEC, localMUS$) 484.0 881.5 804.5 951.3
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS
1976 1986 1996 1997
(USS millions) Composition of total debt, 1997 (USS millions)
Total debt outstanding and disbursed 10,347 46,725 157,500 154,400 B: 75
IBRD 677 4,304 1,841 4,505 A: 4505
IDA 102 106 79 75 C 10,900
Total debt service 1,043 11,240 9,200 10,200
IBRD 50 798 527 535
IDA 1 2 4 4 G:640
Composition of net resource flows
Official grants |. /
Official creditors .
Private creditors F: 70,520
Foreign direct investment 75 -767 -2,345 -1,605
Portfolio equity 0 -333 5,301 -1,300
World Bank program
Commitments 372 562 0 3,000 A - IBRD E - Bilateral
Disbursements 286 332 210 3,161 8- IDA D-Other multilateral F - Private
Principal repayments 12 434 386 363 C - IMF G - Short-term1
Net flows 273 -102 -178 2,798
Interest payments 38 364 141 172
Net transfers 235 -467 -316 2,626
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